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PRIVACY AS SAFETY
A. Michael Froomkin* & Zak Colangelo**
Abstract: The idea that privacy makes you safer is unjustly neglected: public officials
emphasize the dangers of privacy while contemporary privacy theorists acknowledge that
privacy may have safety implications but hardly dwell on the point. We argue that this lack of
emphasis is a substantive and strategic error and seek to rectify it. This refocusing is
particularly timely given the proliferation of new and invasive technologies for the home and
for consumer use more generally, not to mention surveillance technologies such as so-called
smart cities.
Indeed, we argue—perhaps for the first time in modern conversations about privacy—that
in many cases privacy is safety, and that, in practice, United States law already recognizes this
fact. Although the connection rarely figures in contemporary conversations about privacy, the
relationship is implicitly recognized in a substantial but diverse body of U.S. law that protects
privacy as a direct means of protecting safety. As evidence we offer a survey of the ways in
which U.S. law already recognizes that privacy is safety, or at least that privacy enhances
safety. Following modern reformulations of Alan Westin’s four zones of privacy, we explore
the safety-enhancing privacy protections within the personal, intimate, semi-private, and
public zones of life, and find examples in each zone, although cases in which privacy protects
physical safety seem particularly frequent. We close by noting that new technologies such as
the Internet of Things and connected cars create privacy gaps that can endanger their users’
safety, suggesting the need for new safety-enhancing privacy rules in these areas.
By emphasizing the deep connection between privacy and safety, we seek to lay a
foundation for planned future work arguing that U.S. administrative agencies with a safety
mission should make privacy protection one of their goals.
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INTRODUCTION
In this Article we seek to forefront a longstanding justification for
privacy: that it makes you safer. We do so for three reasons.
First, privacy is too often attacked on the grounds that it grants terrorists
and criminals the ability to put people in harm’s way.1 We do not, in this
1. The law-enforcement argument is exemplified by the testimony of an FBI representative
to Congress:
In order to better protect this nation and its people from harm, we need to be able to access
electronic information . . . [or else] we may not be able to root out the child predators hiding in
the shadows of the Internet, or find and arrest violent criminals who are targeting our
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Article, analyze the strength of claims that privacy may be harmful.
Rather, we seek to balance the discussion by pointing out that privacy is
a two-way street, in that it also protects people from many dangers, and
that (primarily U.S.) law and official practices already reflect this
understanding in a variety of ways. We believe that this reminder is
particularly timely given the proliferation of new and invasive
technologies for the home and for consumer use more generally, not to
mention surveillance technologies such as so-called smart cities.2
neighborhoods. We may not be able to identify and stop terrorists who are using social media to
recruit, plan, and execute an attack in our country. We may not be able to recover critical
information from a device that belongs to a victim who cannot provide us with the password,
especially when time is of the essence.
Statement Before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigation, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Amy Hess, Executive Assistant Director, Science
and Technology Branch Federal Bureau of Investigation), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/
deciphering-the-debate-over-encryption [https://perma.cc/3YWB-NJVB]; see also STEWART BAKER,
SKATING ON STILTS (2010).
Other arguments rest on the need to prevent the use of information communication technologies to
silence or harm women and other vulnerable groups. See DANIELLE K. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN
CYBERSPACE (2014); Danielle K. Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying
Bad Samaritans Section 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (2017); Mary A. Franks, Sexual
Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655 (2012) (proposing liability on intermediaries so they will
identify or discipline bad actors); Erin Peebles, Cyberbullying: Hiding Behind the Screen, 19(10)
PEDIATRICS & CHILD HEALTH 527 (2014)
Justice Scalia, himself at times a defender of privacy, summed up the case against anonymity, a strong
form of privacy, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). Anonymity, he wrote, is
generally dishonorable: “It facilitates wrong by eliminating accountability, which is ordinarily the very
purpose of the anonymity.” Id. at 385 (Scalia, J., dissenting). To create legal protection for anonymous
communication absent a reason to expect “threats, harassment, or reprisals,” he argued, “seems to me a
distortion of the past that will lead to a coarsening of the future.” Id.
2. A “smart city” is a “data-driven city [that] depends on data collected from buildings, infrastructure,
people, and third-party data brokers. Government agencies, quasi-governmental utilities, commercial
interests, and others will trace, analyze, and predict the movements, needs, and scarcities of citizens in the
city in order to manage resources and protect the community most effectively.” Janine S. Hiller & Jordan
M. Blanke, Smart Cities, Big Data, and the Resilience of Privacy, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 311 (2017).
Commonly, the monitoring devices will include components of the so-called “Internet of Things.” See Jesse
W. Woo, Smart Cities Pose Privacy Risks and Other Problems, but That Doesn’t Mean We Shouldn’t Build
Them, 85 UMKC L. REV. 953, 955 (2017). The result, in either case, is “ubiquitous surveillance.” Kelsey
Finch & Omer Tene, Welcome to the Metropticon: Protecting Privacy in a Hyperconnected Town, 41
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1581, 1582 (2014). For discussion of some of the privacy issues raised by extensive
data collection in smart cities, see ALVARO ARTIGAS, INSTITUT BARCELONA D'ESTUDIS INTERNACIONALS,
SURVEILLANCE, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SAFE CITY SOLUTIONS: THE CASE OF
CHINESE ICT FIRMS AND THEIR INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION TO EMERGING MARKETS 1 (2017),
https://www.ibei.org/surveillance-smart-technologies-and-the-development-of-safe-city-solutions-thecase-of-chinese-ict-firms-and-their-international-expansion-to-emerging-markets_112561.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CP8X-477M]; THEO BASS, EMMA SUTHERLAND & TOM SYMONS, DECODE, RECLAIMING
THE SMART CITY PERSONAL DATA, TRUST AND THE NEW COMMONS
(2018),
https://media.nesta.org.uk/documents/DECODE-2018_report-smart-cities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7LJZX2BR]; Finch & Tene, supra note 2. A somewhat more positive account appears in Woo, supra note 2.
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Second, the current—and understandable—focus on the dataprotection strand of privacy protection (which focuses on the how)
threatens to obscure other worthy justifications for privacy (the why).
That privacy enhances safety is, most certainly, not a new idea. But, with
the possible exception of debates over electronic privacy, concepts of
safety tend not to figure centrally in contemporary conversations about
privacy. With the coming of smart cities and other types of mass
surveillance in the physical and electronic realms, however, personal
privacy is threatened as never before.3 It is time, therefore, for some
modern threat analysis: in what ways are people put in danger—
physically, economically, politically—by having others within the private
or public sectors know things about them? We seek to rescue this aspect
of the privacy pantheon from its slide into relative obscurity.
Third, we seek to lay a foundation for future work4 showing how—if
privacy is indeed a form of safety—it follows that a number of U.S.
administrative agencies charged with ensuring various aspects of public
safety have a heretofore unacknowledged duty to consider privacy issues
when crafting their regulations.5
Demonstrating that privacy is actually a form of safety will, in turn,
open the door for future U.S. administrative-law arguments that federal
agencies with safety missions—including the Federal Aviation
Administration,6 the Consumer Product Safety Commission,7 and the
Food and Drug Administration8—are legally obligated to consider privacy
consequences when drafting safety rules that directly or indirectly affect
privacy.9 Drawing attention to the ways in which privacy enhances safety
3. See infra section III.B.2, Part IV.
4. Tentatively titled “Safety as Privacy.”
5. In the United States, there are a number of agencies with statutory obligations to protect public
safety in various ways. For example, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is charged with
protecting public safety in air transportation. In crafting rules for the regulation of unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones, the FAA has consistently taken the position that its
safety mandate is limited to physical safety and does not require—if indeed it even permits—
consideration of the privacy-related consequences of UAV usage. See, e.g., Operation and
Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544, 9552–53 (Feb. 23, 2015) (to
be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 45, 47, 61, 91, 101, 107, and 183).
6. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 40104 (2012) (“The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
shall encourage the development of civil aeronautics and safety of air commerce in and outside the
United States.”).
7. See Griswold Insulation Co. v. Lula Cotton Processing Co., 540 F. Supp. 1334, 1339 (M.D.
Tenn. 1982) (holding that economic injury is in the scope of Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC) regulation, as the statutory term “risk of injury” is not limited to physical injury).
8. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2012) (requiring FDA to ensure that “there is reasonable assurance
of the safety and effectiveness of [regulated] devices intended for human use”).
9. The court declined to reach this issue in Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Federal
Aviation Administration, 892 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
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should lead more routinely to treating privacy as a legitimate object of
safety agendas. This instrumental goal (not to mention our own parochial
limitations) explains the U.S.-centric approach in what follows.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. It begins by offering working
definitions of two key terms: “privacy” and “safety.” The second Part
looks at contemporary privacy theory and offers some justifications for
our claim that the safety value of privacy plays only a very small role. The
third and longest Part turns from theory to practice, and provides a catalog
of rules and circumstances in which the U.S. legal system explicitly or
implicitly recognizes the importance of privacy as a means of achieving
safety. The fourth Part identifies certain technological (and in one case
social) innovations that threaten privacy and in so doing undermine safety;
to the extent that these innovations are susceptible to regulation, it likely
follows that making rules to protect personal privacy would make
people safer.
The Article concludes that both theoretical discussions of privacy and
practical attempts to make both safety-enhancing and privacy-enhancing
policies would benefit from taking fuller account of the important role that
privacy can play in making us safe.
I.

TWO DEFINITIONS

A.

Privacy

Privacy is a notoriously protean concept. It is social.10 It is
multifarious.11 It is sometimes said to be incoherent.12 If judged solely by
10. See BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., PRIVACY: STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY
73 (1984).
11. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006).
12. See Julie E. Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 1 (2019)
(“The problem of theorizing privacy moves on two levels, the first consisting of an inadequate
conceptual vocabulary and the second consisting of an inadequate institutional grammar. Theories
about privacy have a tendency to dissolve into contradictions. So, for example, one justification
commonly asserted for privacy is that it promotes and protects individual autonomy, but making
privacy serve autonomy effectively is impossible unless one confronts the constructedness of
selfhood. Another common justification for privacy is that it promotes and protects an essential degree
of separation between self and society. That justification is implicitly predicated on the reality of
social construction, but making privacy serve the construction of selfhood effectively is impossible
unless one confronts privacy’s social (i.e., collective) value.”); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing
Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1088—89 (2002) (footnotes omitted) (“Time and again
philosophers, legal theorists, and jurists have lamented the great difficulty in reaching a satisfying
conception of privacy. Arthur Miller has declared that privacy is ‘difficult to define because it is
exasperatingly vague and evanescent.’ According to Julie Inness, the legal and philosophical
discourse of privacy is in a state of ‘chaos.’ Alan Westin has stated that ‘[f]ew values so fundamental
to society as privacy have been left so undefined in social theory . . . .’ William Beaney has noted that

08 Froomkin_Name Correction copy.docx (Do Not Delete)

146

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

9/17/20 12:42 PM

[Vol. 95:141

the volume of academic writing today, though, privacy is about data
protection.13 This is only natural: due to rapid technical change,
informational privacy is the fastest-shriveling portion of the privacy
landscape. It is the area where, thanks largely to the European Union’s
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),14 we see the most legal
ferment.
Privacy theorists’ focus on informational privacy crowds out the
safety-enhancing aspects of privacy from contemporary conversations
even though it is common to state that privacy is important to allow human
flourishing.15 For example, Julie Cohen sees privacy as necessary to “the
‘even the most strenuous advocate of a right to privacy must confess that there are serious problems
of defining the essence and scope of this right.’ Privacy has ‘a protean capacity to be all things to all
lawyers,’ Tom Gerety has observed. According to Robert Post, ‘[p]rivacy is a value so complex, so
entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct
meanings, that I sometimes despair whether it can be usefully addressed at all.’ Several theorists have
surveyed the interests that the law protects under the rubric of privacy and have concluded that they
are distinct and unrelated. Judith Thompson has even argued that privacy as a concept serves no useful
function, for what we call privacy really amounts to a set of other more primary interests.”).
13. See Bert-Jaap Koops et al., A Typology of Privacy, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 483, 487–88 (2017)
(noting “the trend, visible since the 1960s, to focus predominantly on informational privacy and
data protection”).
14. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ
L [2016] 119/1 at Arts. 17, 21 [hereinafter GDPR].
15. A few examples are FERDINAND D. SCHOEMAN, PRIVACY AND SOCIAL FREEDOM 22 (1992)
(stating privacy “protect[s] individuals from the overreaching control of others”); Chris Clark, Against
Confidentiality? Privacy, Safety and the Public Good in Professional Communications, 6(2) J. SOC.
WORK 117, 124 (2006) (“[T]he point of privacy-as-seclusion is . . . that it serves to protect the sphere
of the private-as-non-public. Without protection of the private-as-non-public the way is open to
fascism and other sorts of totalitarianism.”); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer
Look at Copyright Management in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1006—07 (1996) (arguing
that “[t]houghts and opinions, which are the predicates to speech, cannot arise in a vacuum,” and a
right to read anonymously is necessary for the “iterative process of ‘speech-formation—which
determines, ultimately, both the content of one’s speech and the particular viewpoint one espouses”);
H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Privacy and Limited Democracy: The Moral Centrality of Persons, 17(2)
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 120 (2000) (noting that rights to privacy mark where individuals continue to
maintain authority over themselves); Daniel E. Newman, European Union and United States Personal
Information Privacy, and Human Rights Philosophy - Is There a Match, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP.
L.J. 307, 312 (2008) (“If a person is unable to control access to personal information about herself,
then she may be subjected to unwanted social pressures to conform to norms that she may not
otherwise wish to adopt.”); id. at 315 (“Privacy, as interiority, is meant to preserve inner-reflection,
which leads to outer, social good through the activity of a self-reflective, self-realized individual.”);
Jed Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784 (1989) (arguing that core of right
to privacy is the right to determine the course of one’s own life); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence
of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 979 (1991) (internal footnotes omitted) (“[Privacy] provides an
opportunity for individual self-development, for individual decision making and for protection against
endless caretaking. In addition, there are other related aspects of privacy, such as the notion of
autonomy, equality, liberty, and freedom of bodily integrity, that are central to women’s independence
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liberal self’s capacity for critical independence of thought and judgment,
its commitments to self-actualization and reason, and its aspiration to
cosmopolitanism” all of which she describes as “essential tools for
identifying and pursuing the material and political conditions for selffulfillment and more broadly for human flourishing.”16 “Privacy,” agrees
Ryan Calo, “is best understood as an instrument of human flourishing.”17
It is much less common—even in accounts that view privacy as a solely
instrumental good—to discuss privacy as enhancing safety. This Article
seeks to contribute to the development of privacy theory by
filling that gap.
But before assessing the role of safety in privacy theory, it is helpful to
provide, as context, an overview of certain significant and influential
understandings or definitions of what “privacy” is and why it is important.
Scholars routinely lament the difficulty of defining “privacy.”
According to Daniel J. Solove, this definitional difficulty stems, in part,
from an inability to see the forest for the trees.18 Theorists have failed to
develop a useful conception of the term, Solove argues, because they have
generally “failed to adequately conceptualize the problems that privacy
law is asked to redress.”19 Untethered to a notion of what privacy should
do, scholars have been unable to say what it is.
1.

Earlier Definitions of Privacy

Perhaps because of this difficulty, definitions of privacy can be very
general. Famously, Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren wrote that privacy
is the “right to be let alone.”20 This fundamental insight remains one of
the most cited and influential definitions of privacy in the past 100 years.
Another foundational conception of privacy traces to Alan Westin’s
1967 book Privacy and Freedom. Westin understood privacy as a fourstage spectrum—solitude, intimacy, anonymity, and reserve—in which
the individual’s involvement with the public sphere increases at each

and well-being.”).
16. Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1911 (2013).
17. Ryan Calo, Privacy and Markets: A Love Story, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 651 (2015)
(citing Cohen, supra note 16).
18. Solove, supra note 12, at 1090.
19. Id.
20. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193
(1890). Cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (writing
that U.S. Constitution “conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone–the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men”).
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stage.21 Solitude is the most complete type of privacy that one can achieve.
It is marked by isolation from other people, leaving one alone with one’s
thoughts.22 Moving one step closer to the public sphere, intimacy refers to
an individual’s involvement in a small social circle: with spouses,
partners, friends, families, or other close-knit communities like
coworkers.23 Anonymity exists where one resides in the public sphere but
nevertheless avoids the focused attention of others.24 This is a type of
“public privacy,” or privacy in public.25 The final state—reserve—
involves the erection of barriers to prevent others from accessing
information about oneself.26 These barriers may grow from the subject, as
where one declines to share information, or from the discretion of the
others, as where the individual relies on the restraint of others to avoid the
sharing of the private.27
In contrast, Solove argues for a “pragmatic” approach to
conceptualizing privacy, “focusing on the palpable consequences of
[privacy] rather than on [its] correspondence to an ultimate reality.”28 In
this way, Solove subscribes to philosopher John Dewey’s view that
“philosophical inquiry should begin as a response to dealing with life’s
problems and difficulties.”29 Specifically, Solove argues that “privacy” is
best understood through Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concept of “family
resemblances.”30 The idea of “family resemblances” rejects the
proposition that a concept—for example, privacy—can be defined
through identification of universally applicable necessary and sufficient
conditions, or “rigid conceptual boundaries and common
denominators.”31 Thus rejecting the search for a term’s essence,
Wittgenstein instead looks to the “complicated network of similarities
overlapping and crisscrossing.”32 Correspondingly, Solove suggests we

21. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AS FREEDOM 31–32 (1967).
22. Id. at 31.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 32.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Solove, supra note 12, at 1091.
29. Id. at 1093 (citing JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC, THE THEORY OF INQUIRY 106–10 (Jo Ann Boydston
ed., 1988)).
30. Id. at 1092, 1126–27.
31. Id. at 1126.
32. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, § 66, 27 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 1958).
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look to pools of similarities and differences between different types or
aspects of things that might be considered private. Solove himself looks
to privacy “practices”—“activities, customs, norms, and traditions”33—to
identify the manner in which the concept has developed as a matter of
reality. To “define” the term, therefore, Solove focuses on “certain matters
[that] Western societies have long understood as private: the family, the
body, and the home.”34
In this view, privacy is that collection of things that we consider private
and that, in practice, are treated as private. It is a descriptivist approach,
and it seeks to reflect commonsensical understandings of what is, or
should be, private. The descriptivist approach, however, leads to another
potential problem in defining “privacy”: people’s professed
understanding of what is or should be private often does not track with
their actions.35 That is, while people say they want privacy, their actions
often suggest otherwise.
Helen Nissenbaum seeks to resolve this seeming contradiction with her
theory of privacy as contextual integrity.36 Her approach to understanding
privacy is analogous to tort law’s focus on reasonableness. Heavily
contextual, what might be private in one situation might not be private in
another. A privacy violation, then, is not merely the sharing of given
information, but the inappropriate sharing thereof—an inquiry that calls
for an evaluation of context.37 Nissenbaum’s definition of privacy
violations suggests that people are not, in the main, insincere or irrational
when they state a preference for privacy but act in ways that seem to
undermine that preference:
If a right to privacy is a right to context-appropriate flows [of
information], and not to secrecy or to control over information
about oneself, there is no paradox in caring deeply about privacy
and, at the same time, eagerly sharing information as long as the
sharing and withholding conform with the principled conditions
prescribed by governing contextual norms.38
33. See Solove, supra note 12, at 1092.
34. Id. at 1093.
35. See, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 104–08 (2010) (recognizing the “stark contradiction” between people’s
stated concern for privacy and their actions: “[i]n almost all situations in which people must choose
between privacy and just about any other good, they choose the other good,” for example, “credit
cards over cash, E-ZPass over traditional toll payments, . . . traceable search engines over selfdirected Web surfing”).
36. Id.
37. See id. at 186–230.
38. Id. at 187.
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Julie E. Cohen’s definition of privacy is similar in the sense that it is
dynamic, incapable of being reduced to a “fixed condition or attribute
(such as seclusion or control) whose boundaries can be crisply delineated
by the application of deductive logic.”39 But while Nissenbaum defines
privacy in relation to the full spectrum of possible contexts, Cohen’s
approach is narrower, connecting privacy to notions of autonomy and selfdevelopment:
Privacy is shorthand for breathing room to engage in the
processes of boundary management that enable and constitute
self-development. So understood, privacy is fundamentally
dynamic. In a world characterized by pervasive social shaping of
subjectivity, privacy fosters (partial) self-determination. It
enables individuals both to maintain relational ties and to develop
critical perspectives on the world around them.40
To Cohen, privacy is valuable, in part, because it permits selfdevelopment which is necessary for the development of the informed
citizenry on which the viability of liberal democracy depends.41 To
achieve this end, society must protect the physical, economic, and mental
safety of the marginalized,42 all of which we would call forms of safety.
2.

A Typology of Privacy

Others take a very different approach to defining privacy. In an original
and thorough recent article, A Typology of Privacy, (hereinafter Typology)
a group of scholars led by Bert-Jaap Koops offer a lens by which to rethink
our understanding of privacy. These scholars identify eight basic, or
“ideal,” types of privacy, and a ninth type that overlaps with and touches
each of them.43 Typology claims that privacy “can be captured by [this]
set of related concepts that together constitute privacy.”44 The eight ideal
types are: (1) bodily, (2) spatial, (3) communicational, (4) proprietary or
property-based, (5) intellectual, (6) decisional, (7) associational,
and (8) behavioral.45
The overlay, which does not completely overlap with the eight ideal

39. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1906.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1912–18.
42. See id.
43. Koops et al., supra note 13, at 566–68.
44. Id. at 488 (emphasis omitted).
45. Id. at 566–68.
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types, is informational privacy.46 Despite recognizing the frequency with
which informational privacy is treated as a distinct type of privacy, the
authors argue that, because “each ideal type of privacy contains an
element of informational privacy,” it is better understood as an overlay.47
As to the eight ideal types of privacy, the authors have analyzed their
similarities and differences along certain “dimensions.” They first map
them along a spectrum of four zones of privacy, running from “the
personal or completely private zone to intimate, semi-private, and public
zones.”48 Building here on Alan Westin’s foundational categorization of
solitude, intimacy, anonymity and reserve,49 as well as work by Roger
Clarke, Anita Allen, Rachel L. Finn, David Wright and Michael
Friedewald, the authors offer the following definitions:
The intimate zone is characterized by a shift towards social
engagement, albeit limited to intimate partners, family members,
and close friends, as well as activities that take place in private
and fenced-off spaces, such as the home where people share their
life with intimate partners and family. The semi-private zone
includes social interaction with a wider range of actors, including
acquaintances, work colleagues, and professional relationships
(e.g., interacting with a doctor, service provider or shop), and
activities that occur in more quasi-public space. The public zone
is typified by activities occurring in public—for example, in a
public square, on public transportation, or on publicly accessible
electronic platforms—where the privacy interest is characterized
by the desire to be inconspicuous despite being physically or
virtually visible in public space. This zone sits at the edge of the
outer layer of privacy and social life.50
The authors also map their eight ideal types along the spectrum of
negative and positive freedom, although they concede this distinction has
some difficulties.51 Finally, they map the types based on distinctions
between “restricted access and subsequent control after access has been
granted.”52 On this point, they note that, generally:
This dimension is not independent from the other two, but rather
combines both in the sense that restricted access is associated
more (but not exclusively) with the private than with the public
46. Id. at 568.
47. Id. at 568–69.
48. Id. at 564.
49. See supra section I.A.1.
50. Koops et al., supra note 13, at 564 (emphasis omitted).
51. Id. at 565.
52. Id.
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zone, and more with negative freedom than with positive
freedom, while control after access is more significant in the
semi-private and public zones and has more the character of a
positive freedom (self-determination) . . . . For example, any
privacy interest in a person’s behavior in public space has more
to do with controlling the use of information about that activity
than it does with restricting access (since some access has already
been granted by the nature of the space itself). On the other hand,
bodily privacy is typically (although not always) a question of
access, rather than control.53
The authors also give us a graphical summary of the
Typology’s landscape:
Figure 1:
Summary of the Privacy Typology54

Our overall conception of privacy is as broad as that in the Typology: it
includes negative and positive freedom; it refers to restricted access and
restricted post-acquisition use; it includes physical aspects of privacy as
well as informational aspects. That said, our focus on safety means that
we first emphasize directly physical privacy, and only then intellectual
privacy, followed by economic and other forms of privacy, although
informational privacy also remains important because the safety issues we
discuss arise from allowing others to acquire information about
53. Id.
54. Id. at 484.

08 Froomkin_Name Correction copy.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

PRIVACY AS SAFETY

9/17/20 12:42 PM

153

their target.
Claims to each of these aspects of privacy, whether or not they are
claims to a “right” of privacy, include demands to be able to exclude
others, or their mechanical proxies, from places and things, including,
but—importantly—not limited to, data. Privacy protects access to
physical bodies, and it protects against the observation of facts about the
location and activities of bodies. It also does similar work for our things:
inhibiting or preventing access to them, the observation of them, and the
collection of information about their location, uses, and characteristics.
Because our discussion involves so much of what the Typology deems the
overlay of informational privacy, we turn to a brief discussion of
informational privacy.
3.

Informational Privacy

Persons can control the release of information about themselves in
different ways, depending on the circumstances. Controlled access might
be achieved, for example, by unobservability,55 by untraceability,56 by
anonymity,57 or by pseudonymity. This Article thus involves minimal
discussion of the aspects of privacy that motivate much work on data
protection, where the focus is frequently on limiting a recipient’s use of
another’s data. Such legal limits, notably those in GDPR,58 undoubtedly
protect privacy in different and sometimes more general ways than the
one that demands our attention here,59 as those aspects of privacy fail to
engage issues of safety as directly as the aspects we have chosen to
focus on.
Admittedly, it is not difficult to formulate or even justify many “claims

55. “Unobservability is when you can not be observed. For example, shutting the door to the
bathroom offers unobservability.” Adam Shostack & Paul Syverson, What Price Privacy? – and Why
Identity Theft is About Neither Identity Nor Theft, in ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY 129,
130 (L. Jean Camp & Stephen Lewis, eds. 2004).
56. “Untraceability is when you cannot be traced from one identity to another. For example, ‘John,
who we play softball with, but don’t know his last name’ is untraceable; you can’t track down a phone
number for him.” Id.; see also A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmities, 1 J. ONLINE L. art.
4 (1995) [hereinafter, Froomkin, Anonymity], https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2
715621 (last visited Mar. 9, 2020) (distinguishing between traceable and untraceable forms of
anonymity and pseudonymity).
57. “Anonymity is when you are without any identifiers.” Shostack & Syverson, supra note 55,
at 130.
58. See GDPR, supra note 14.
59. “Informational self-determination is when you are confident that information you provide will
be used only in ways you understand and approve. Giving your mother your new phone number
probably qualifies.” Shostack & Syverson, supra note 55, at 130.
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to exclude” as claims to prevent others from learning facts about oneself,
and thus to formulate claims to exclude as claims about data, broadly
defined. That is, excluding people from one’s home prevents others from
seeing quite how horrible one is before one’s morning coffee. Excluding
people from one’s credit-card records prevents them from seeing how
cheap or spendthrift one may be. Excluding others from one’s medical
records protects against employment consequences, or just
embarrassment, that might arise from one’s health problems being
publicized. Excluding the world from one’s diary secures the freedom to
experiment with stupid or potentially unpopular ideas.
It is important to note, however, that the privacy which prevents access
to bodies and things, and to facts about bodies and things, is not simply
regulating the management of data about persons—in most cases it forbids
or even makes physically impossible the collection of those data. That can
be a distinction with a difference.60
B.

Safety

“Safety,” like privacy, is a malleable concept. It is also potentially quite
broad, and we mean to use it broadly. By “safety,” we mean, first, the
ability to protect one’s bodily integrity, and that of one’s family and
associates, from physical harms and/or threats. Secondarily, we mean the
ability to protect one’s livelihood and one’s possessions (and that of
family and associates) from harm, or threat or diminishment. Both of these
types of safety protect against an array of potential exercises of unjustified
coercive power, ranging from threats of violence, to blackmail, to routine
price discrimination. And as explained below, both of those types of
safety can be indirectly secured or at least enhanced by the protection of
privacy. Furthermore, to the extent that privacy can create a sense of
safety and security, it may provide important psychological benefits,
translating at times into physiological ones.61
We therefore adopt a definition of “safety” that may not be intuitively
obvious. For example, we treat situations that may subject an individual
to atypical economic coercion as dangers that may make one unsafe.
Similarly, we treat blackmail—which threatens shame—as a safety threat.
Arguably, the capability to impose substantial emotional stress is itself a
60. Cf. A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000) (arguing for
regulation of data-collection technology in part because once data is collected it is harder to regulate);
A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning from
Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713 (2015) (proposing that some
surveillance technology be regulated as environmental damage).
61. See infra text accompanying note 76 and sections III.B.1, B.2.
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safety threat if only because emotional stress can have physical effects.
To argue that privacy (as defined) is safety (as defined), or at least can
be a substantial contributor to safety, is (1) to argue that in many cases
privacy reduces certain dangers and (2) to argue, implicitly or explicitly,
that safety from those dangers is at least good and legitimate,62 and
perhaps even necessary for the enjoyment of some other right, e.g., rights
to life, liberty, or property. The instrumental argument that privacy is
safety engages implicitly or explicitly with claims (or counter-claims) that
privacy is harmful, for instance, that it actually makes people less safe.
These competing instrumental claims clash in the shadow not only of
claims that privacy is itself a human right63 (in which case claims that
privacy is harmful might lose relevance), but also of claims that various
other human rights are furthered by privacy or a lack thereof. Thus, for
example, the twin debates over the legal regulation of cryptography and
over legal demands for data-retention policies have largely consisted of
factual assertions about how those policies will protect or harm
individuals.64 However, these debates have also at times touched on these
policies’ interactions with rights to freedom of expression, to freedom of
association, and even to property.65
In Part III, below, we describe how a variety of existing legal rules
reflect a recognition that privacy enhances safety. As regards our
discussion of the dangers that privacy protects against, we adopt a worstcase-analysis framework in the interest of simplification. By focusing on
the danger to the individual (harms that have some probability of
happening), rather than on risk (which implies a measure of the actual
likelihood of the event), we focus on the capabilities of those against
whom privacy is interposed as a defense, rather than engaging with the
intruder’s intentions. By using the word “intruder,” we mean to connote
both an intrusion into someone’s private affairs such as informational
privacy breach and also an actual physical intrusion. The intentions of
people, firms, and governments are not only varied but often opaque; a
focus on capabilities rather than intentions reduces the scope of what
remains a large and difficult problem, as one need not try to read minds.
Similarly, we leave for another day a discussion of cost-benefit
calculations, in which one tries to compare alleged costs of privacy with
62. This is so because, while privacy is sometimes assailed as a negative, safety is almost always
viewed as a positive, although there can be exceptions: making terrorists safer is not, we presume,
generally considered a positive.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 213 and 335.
64. See infra section III.E.3.
65. See id.
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alleged benefits, as these too require an assessment of probable, rather
than simply possible, actions.
II.

THE ROLE OF SAFETY IN CONTEMPORARY
PRIVACY THEORY

Contemporary privacy theory, by and large, pays too little attention to
the ways in which privacy enhances safety. That does not mean that
contemporary privacy theorists fail to recognize the point, just that few of
them address it in any detail, perhaps because it seems obvious, or perhaps
because the idea is not central to their arguments.
The failure to address privacy’s impact on safety may also be a result
of the specific approaches, discussed in section I.A.1 above, that scholars
have taken in their attempts to describe privacy. One common approach
to defining the term has been the attempt to “develop a unitary conception
of privacy in the form of a unified conceptual core,”66 which is most
similar to how we generally define terms. To those taking this approach,
safety is likely an afterthought.67 Interrelated though we argue privacy and
safety are, we do not suggest that safety forms the very core of privacy’s
meaning or value.
The second typical approach to defining privacy has been to catalogue
different types or aspects of privacy and “mak[e] meaningful distinctions
between” them.68 This approach is obviously descriptive rather than
prescriptive, but it can still offer hints at a definition of privacy by locating
its common, and perhaps necessary or sufficient, characteristics or
conditions. One might expect safety to figure more prominently under this
approach, as there clearly exist clusters of privacy protections that bear on
safety. Yet, with the partial exception of the Typology, which does discuss
safety at times, we see little of this in the literature.
A third approach treats privacy as inherently good. This is the approach
taken by authors like Julie Cohen. Other than to note that preserving the
“breathing room” for the self is necessary for the self-development that
enables both human flourishing and meaningful democratic
participation,69 Julie Cohen’s work does not focus on the interplay of
privacy and safety. To Cohen, privacy is not simply of instrumental value.
It is inherently good. Pushing back against the commoditization of
privacy, Cohen argues that privacy’s rightful place is alongside values like
66. See Koops et al., supra note 13, at 487; Solove, supra note 12, at 1095–99.
67. See supra text accompanying note 15.
68. Koops et al., supra note 13, at 487; Solove, supra note 12, at 1095–99.
69. See Cohen, supra note 16, at 1906 and text accompanying notes 40–41.
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dignity, equality, and freedom, because it is a necessary condition for the
development of the self.70 To Cohen, “the values of informational privacy
are far more fundamental” than a mere matter of preference or taste.71 “A
degree of freedom from scrutiny and categorization by others promotes
important noninstrumental values, and serves vital individual and
collective ends.”72
A fourth approach is the one that most often leads scholars to expressly
connect privacy to safety. It is a “reductionist approach[] that define[s]
privacy as instrumental to realizing a more basic human value, such as
liberty, autonomy, property, or bodily integrity.”73 In some ways, this
instrumental approach is not about defining privacy but identifying its
value. That makes it most likely to discuss safety. The relationship
between privacy and safety grows less out of a definition of privacy than
from an understanding of its practical value. Still, even where authors
address the instrumental value of privacy, they often omit any mention
of safety.74
The instrumental approach is, in a sense, the one adopted by this
Article. Our definition of privacy is, as noted above, encompassing. On
the other hand, we make no claim that safety enhancement is a necessary
or sufficient condition for privacy. Instead, we argue that one way in
which privacy is valuable is its ability to enhance safety. Whether it is
necessary or sufficient for safety will vary with the circumstances.
70. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000).
71. Id. at 1423.
72. Id.
73. Koops et al., supra note 13, at 492; see also, e.g., Judith J. Thompson, The Right to Privacy, in
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 272 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman, ed., 1984) (arguing that
privacy, as a concept, is worthless because the term, as generally used, simply amounts to a group of
other, more fundamental, interests).
74. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 12, at 1093–94 (listing the fundamental interests instrumentally
enhanced by privacy, neglecting to mention safety, and going on to state that “[s]ociety’s commitment
to privacy often entails restraining or even sacrificing interests of substantial importance, such
as . . . efficient law enforcement”). Solove also references the portion of privacy discourse that views
“the value of privacy in terms of furthering a number of different ends.” Id. at 1145. In fact, this is
Solove’s approach: “I contend that privacy should be valued instrumentally.” Id. at 1144. Looking to
prior scholarship, Solove states, “Fried claims that privacy fosters love and friendship. Bloustein
argues that privacy protects dignity and individuality. Boling and Inness claim that privacy is
necessary for intimate human relationships. According to Gavison, privacy is essential for autonomy
and freedom.” Id. at 1145 (citations omitted). Then, looking to his own instrumental understanding
of privacy, he notes that “there are a number of candidates for the value of privacy, as privacy fosters
self-creation, independence, autonomy, creativity, imagination, counter-culture, freedom of thought,
and reputation.” Id. at 1145–46. Thus, we see that even in the scholarship that argues for an
instrumental valuation of privacy, and lists the interests furthered by privacy protections, safety rarely
if ever makes the list.
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In any event, regardless of why privacy is generally not recognized as
enhancing safety, our research suggests there is an absence that needs
filling. Of contemporary works that do address the relationship, most do
so only in passing,75 although there are a few important exceptions.
A leading and significant exception to this near-rule is Alan Westin,
who, in his seminal Privacy and Freedom, suggested that privacy has its
deepest roots in the evolutionary drive towards safety. Nature, he claimed,
resounds with “defiant cr[ies] for privacy, given within the borders of the
animal’s private territory to warn off possible intruders.”76
For Westin, therefore, the desire for privacy arises fundamentally from
a search for safety. Privacy promotes the physical safety of bodies and
things by making it harder for would-be intruders to intrude.77 It protects
something in the nature of “economic safety” by “regulating density to
available resources.”78 Protecting these resources is also arguably
connected to physical safety insofar as scarcity threatens physical health.
Westin also recognizes how overcrowding, i.e., a lack of personal space,
leads to increased aggression and infighting within communities as
members attempt to access scarce resources (and perhaps also as the result
of a biological imperative to control crowding).79 Finally, Westin notes
that privacy promotes safety from illness, as a lack of space leads humans
and animals to “high blood pressure, circulatory diseases, and heart
disease.”80
Turning then to humans, Westin quotes from Robert Merton’s Social
75. Even in Koops et al., supra note 13, where the authors discuss several aspects of privacy that
are related to safety, they do not consider it as a category. In discussing the types of privacy protected
in the constitutions of various nations, the authors identify spatial privacy–the protection of the home
and other places–which could enhance physical safety (by, perhaps, preventing police officers from
storming in and initiating an armed confrontation) and mental safety or wellbeing. See id. at 515–16.
They identify proprietary, or property-based, privacy, which could enhance economic safety. See id.
at 516–18. They identify privacy of computers, which could enhance mental safety or wellbeing (by
avoiding embarrassment, perhaps about one’s browser history) and economic safety. See id. at 518–
20. They identify the privacy of the person, part of which is the protection of the body of the person,
which clearly could enhance physical safety and mental safety or wellbeing. See id. at 529–31. They
expressly note, for example, that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
the right of people to be “‘secure in their persons’” against unreasonable search and seizure, which
incorporates the inviolability of the body. Id. at 530. They even cite U.S. Supreme Court cases in
which the Fourth Amendment operated to protect against physical intrusions into one’s body. Id. at
530 n.170. Still, the ability of privacy to enhance safety is never discussed, in such terms, as one of
the values of privacy.
76. WESTIN, supra note 21, at 9.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 10 (internal citation omitted).
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Theory and Social Structure in arguing that, without privacy, the average
individual would descend into madness: individuals’ “need” for
privacy is the
counterpart to the functional requirement of social structure that
some measure of exemption from full observability be provided
for. Otherwise, the pressure to live up to the details of all (and
often conflicting) social norms would become literally
unbearable; in a complex society, schizophrenic behavior would
become the rule rather than the formidable exception it
already is.81
Building on Westin’s ideas, Adam D. Moore argues that privacy “is
necessary for the species.”82 He cites a study finding that, when rats are
placed in a quarter-acre pen without any privacy, their numbers never
exceeded 200.83 Even when the population reached 150, “fighting became
so disruptive to normal maternal care that only a few of the young
survived.”84 But when privacy protections were put in place, that same
quarter-acre pen was able to support 5,000 rats.85 Moore concludes, then,
“that having the ability to separate, like food and water, is a necessity
of life.”86
Moore extends this conclusion to the human animal. He, like Westin,
recognizes a “link between a lack of privacy and psychological and
physical disorders in humans [as well as] nonhuman animals.”87 Modern
studies on overcrowding in prisons support Moore’s conclusion: the lack
of personal space attendant to incarceration “has been linked to violence,
depression, suicide, psychological disorders, and recidivism.”88 Moore
then shifts his focus, arguing that “it is only through enhanced privacy
protections that we can obtain appropriate levels of security against
industrial espionage, unwarranted invasions into private domains, and
information warfare or terrorism.”89 Relatedly, Moore recognizes that
privacy promotes security in the context of encryption.90
81. Id. at 58 (quoting ROBERT MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 375 (1957)).
82. ADAM D. MOORE, PRIVACY RIGHTS: MORAL AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS 48 (2010).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 55.
88. Id. at 55–56.
89. Id. at 207.
90. Id. at 208–09 (“Although the National Security Administration’s position is that the widespread
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A quite different, if equally rare, example of scholarship addressing the
interaction of privacy and safety is Ruth Gavison’s 1980 article Privacy
and the Limits of Law.91 Gavison recognizes the instrumental value of
privacy, noting that one such benefit is “mental health.”92 Interestingly,
though, she argues that the opposite can be true simultaneously—that
privacy may be harmful to mental health.93 Gavison is receptive to those
“critics of contemporary society” who argue that “we suffer from too
much privacy,” that we deify the private sphere and ignore public aspects
of life such that “individuals are alienated, lonely, and scared.”94
To Gavison, then, privacy is a double-edged sword, especially when it
comes to health and safety. In fact, despite her general view that privacy
is good, she states:
[t]here is something comforting and efficient about [a] total
absence of privacy for all. A person could identify his enemies,
anticipate dangers stemming from other people, and make sure he
was not cheated or manipulated. Criminality would cease, for
detection would be certain, frustration probable, and punishment
sure. The world would be safer, and as a result, the time and
resources now spent on trying to protect ourselves against human
dangers and misrepresentations could be directed to other
things.95
But although claiming that, with a “total absence of privacy,” the “world
would be safer,” Gavison does concede that the subtraction of privacy
would come at “much too high” a price.96
Similar to Gavison’s recognition that privacy may, in some ways, be
inimical to safety, Heidi R. Anderson argues against the recognition of
privacy in public.97 She notes potential negative consequences of Westin’s
use of encryption software will allow criminals a sanctuary to exchange information necessary for the
completion of illegal activities, . . . [n]ational security for government agencies, companies, and
individuals actually requires strong encryption. Spies have admitted to ‘tapping in’ and collecting
valuable information on U.S. companies–information that was then used to gain a competitive
advantage. A report form the CSIS Task Force on Information Warfare and Security notes that ‘cyber
terrorists could overload phone lines . . . disrupt air traffic control . . . scramble software used by
major financial institutions, hospitals, and other emergency services . . . or sabotage the New York
Stock Exchange.’ Related to information war, it would seem that national security requires strong
encryption, multilevel firewalls, and automated detection of attacks.”).
91. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980).
92. Id. at 442.
93. Id. at 440 n.63.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 443 (internal footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
96. Id.
97. See Heidi R. Anderson, The Mythical Right to Obscurity: A Pragmatic Defense of No Privacy
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latter two (and perhaps latter three) stages of privacy—those in which the
individual claims a right to privacy despite engagement with the public
sphere. Generally, Anderson’s position is that privacy is harmful to the
public good where it would prevent exposure of truthful information.98
Specifically, she argues against laws that forbid the recording of police
officers, noting, for example, that a failure to shine a light on police
brutality, might lead to more of it.99
Illustrating the complex interplay between privacy and safety,
Anderson notes that law enforcement’s argument against being recorded
is also founded on claims of safety enhancement. While Anderson argues
that police officers’ activities must be public in order to promote
accountability and public safety, police officers reply that only by keeping
their activities private can they effectively protect public safety:
[P]olice officers and their supporters argue that the threat of
constant surveillance and later distribution via the Internet is an
unfair invasion of privacy that prevents [officers] from adequately
doing their job. For example, officers may hesitate to take
necessary action out of concern that a partial and possibly
inaccurate video recording of that action will lead to the officers’
firing or to bad police work. This concern, in turn, threatens the
officers’ reputation and public safety as a whole.100
While her inquiry into the privacy-safety dynamic is thus quite specific,
Anderson recognizes that privacy and safety are connected, and her
discussion—like Gavison’s—reminds that the issue is not
always straightforward.
As with Anderson and Gavison, Solove too recognizes that privacy is
at times opposed to safety. In Conceptualizing Privacy, he writes that
in Public, 7 ISJLP 543 (2012).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 547–49.
100. Id. at 547. In Nothing to Hide, Solove takes up in more detail the issue of privacy’s struggle
against national security. Typically a strong defender of privacy, Solove argues that the contest
between security and privacy is “skewed . . . too much to the security side.” See DANIEL J. SOLOVE,
NOTHING TO HIDE, at vii (2011). We tend to agree with that conclusion, but we also tend to reject the
frame that produced it. Solove describes the privacy-safety interplay as one where privacy gains
commonly mean security losses. While Solove goes out of his way to disclaim the strongest form of
this position—stating that while “[s]ecurity and privacy often clash, . . . there need not be a zero-sum
tradeoff”—what he appears to mean is that security and privacy can coexist: that proper regulation of
security programs can allow them to be effective without impinging too severely on privacy. Id. at
207. Thus, in Solove’s view, “[t]here is a way to reconcile privacy and security: by placing security
programs under oversight, limiting future uses of personal data, and ensuring that the programs are
carried out in a balanced and controlled manner.” Id. But the very idea of “reconciling” privacy and
security implies that they are countervailing-rather than synergistic-ideals. See id. at 5,207.
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“[s]ociety’s commitment to privacy often entails restraining or even
sacrificing interests of substantial importance, such as . . . efficient law
enforcement.”101 In A Taxonomy of Privacy, Solove lists “security”—
along with free speech and efficient consumer transactions—as an interest
to be balanced against privacy.102
A more optimistic view of safety does appear elsewhere in Solove’s
work, as he has written about the ways in which privacy can
enhance safety:
Disclosure[103] can also threaten people’s security. For example,
many people have good reason to keep their addresses secret,
including victims of stalking and domestic abuse attempting to
hide from those that threaten them, police officers and prosecutors
fearing retaliation by criminals, celebrities desiring to avoid
harassment by paparazzi, and doctors who perform abortions
desiring to protect their family’s safety. People want to protect
information that makes them vulnerable or that can be used by
others to harm them physically, emotionally, financially, and
reputationally. For example, in Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., a
deranged man was obsessed with Amy Lynn Boyer. He purchased
Boyer’s Social Security number and employment address from a
database company called Docusearch. The man went to Boyer’s
workplace and murdered her. The court concluded that “threats
posed by stalking and identity theft lead us to conclude that the
risk of criminal misconduct is sufficiently foreseeable so that an
investigator has a duty to exercise reasonable care in disclosing a
third person’s personal information to a client.”104
Our point is thus not that Solove—or any other scholar—fails to see
the connection between privacy and safety. Solove in fact lists some of
the same safety benefits of privacy as we do below, noting that privacy
can protect physical, emotional, financial, and reputational safety.105 But
in the context of a lengthy and careful analysis of privacy harms, there is
very little express discussion of how the absence of privacy can put safety
at risk or how strong privacy protections can enhance safety. We therefore
101. Solove, supra note 12, at 1093–94.
102. Solove, supra note 11, at 480.
103. Solove defines “disclosure”–a subset of the dissemination harm that he identifies as one of the
four general types of privacy harm–as “the revelation of truthful information about a person that
impacts the way others judge her character.” Id. at 491. This is in contrast to “breach of
confidentiality,” which he defines as “breaking a promise to keep a person’s information
confidential,” and “exposure,” defined as “revealing another’s nudity, grief, or bodily functions.” Id.
104. Id. at 477, 532–33 (citing Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1005–06, 1008 (N.H.
2003)) (internal footnote omitted).
105. Id. at 532–33.
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seek to establish that the relationship between privacy and safety does not
receive the attention it deserves, and that even when scholars focus on it,
they sometimes see the relationship as containing substantial
contradictions and conflicts.
As suggested above, for scholars who believe that privacy has inherent,
non-instrumental value, there is little call to address the ways in which
privacy might enhance safety. And we do not seek in any way to criticize
that view. Rather, we invoke these examples to explain why it is that even
the most thoughtful and careful analyses of privacy commonly fail to
address its safety-enhancing aspects.106 We suggest that discussions of the
value of privacy will be enhanced by redressing this imbalance.
III. PRIVACY AS SAFETY IN PRACTICE
Privacy enhances safety in several broad and overlapping ways: (1) it
makes one physically safer; (2) it provides psychological security; (3) it
makes one economically safer (and protects from some forms of invidious
discrimination); and (4) it makes the exercise of various political
rights safer.107
Our goal in this Part is to persuade the reader not only that in many
cases privacy enhances safety (and that its absence can be dangerous), but
also that in many cases U.S. law already recognizes and protects privacy
in order to protect the safety of individuals in a wide variety
of circumstances.
Our somewhat eclectic examples cut across all of the Typology’s four
zones of privacy. Even though we believe that our examples do not fit
perfectly into the Typology, in what follows we refer to it often in order to
order to connect (and sometimes contrast) our project to the Typology’s
state-of-the-art categorizations.
A.

Bodily and Locational Privacy

The freedom from bodily threats is the most fundamental and personal
form of safety. Bodily privacy relates to an individual’s interest in his or
her own physical body. A person’s ability to control bodily privacy is
directly related to that person’s ability to control interactions with their
106. See, for example, the works cited in note 15, supra, which identify privacy’s core value as
related to autonomy and self-development but do not engage substantially with the interplay of
privacy and safety.
107. Arguably, by reducing stress caused by surveillance and other invasions of privacy, it also
makes one safer from illness, but we do not explore that in this Article.
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environment and with other people.108 The key concerns include the
ability to exclude unwanted physical contact and to restrict information
about an individual’s body.109
If Alice wishes to harm Bob, she must first find him. Locational
privacy, also redundantly known as “geolocational privacy,” is the ability
to keep secret where one is.110 Locational privacy is thus a strong protector
against all sorts of real and potential dangers to physical safety, making it
one of the most powerful types of freedom from harm. The most extreme
example of the value of location data comes from the U.S. Air Force,
which boasted that the day after a militant posted a selfie posing in front
of a command post, the Air Force used the geolocation data embedded in
the digital file to send out drones with missiles to destroy the entire
complex.111 The shoe was on the other foot when researchers revealed that
cumulative data from Strava, a fitness app, could be used to create usage
‘heat maps’ that disclosed the location of U.S. military bases.112
According to Nathan Ruser, the maps pointed to likely “US military
forward operating bases in Afghanistan, Turkish military patrols in Syria,
and a possible guard patrol in the Russian operating area of Syria.”113 To
make matters worse, when the Strava app first attempted to allow users to
mark sensitive spots as private, the result often was to make them stand
out instead.114 Other fitness apps have been shown to be
similarly revealing.115
108. Koops et al, supra note 13, at 567.
109. Id. at 498, 567.
110. See, e.g., Andrew J. Blumberg & Peter Eckersley, On Locational Privacy, and How to Avoid
Losing it Forever, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.eff.org/wp/locational-privacy
[https://perma.cc/4Q2Y-ARJV] (providing a definition of location privacy); see generally Marketa
Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 567 (2012) (discussing hiding one’s location in order to bypass or
make ineffective attempts to partition the Internet geographically).
111. Walbert Castillo, U.S. Bombs ISIS Using Social Media Intel, CNN (June 5, 2015, 5:15 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2015/06/05/politics/air-force-isis-moron-twitter/index.html
[https://perma.cc/UQA5-UH2B].
112. Jeremy Hsu, The Strava Heat Map and the End of Secrets, WIRED (Jan. 29, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/strava-heat-map-military-bases-fitness-trackers-privacy/
[https://perma.cc/T2HL-8FZ4].
113. Id.
114. Rob Pegoraro, The Strava Social Exercise App Can Reveal Your Home Address, YAHOO FIN.
(Feb. 7, 2018), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/social-exercise-app-can-give-away-home-address182247535.html [https://perma.cc/PM5C-2KH9].
115. See, e.g., Maurits Martijn et al., This Fitness App Lets Anyone Find Names and Addresses for
Thousands of Soldiers and Secret Agents, DE CORRESPONDENT, https://decorrespondent.nl/8480/thisfitness-app-lets-anyone-find-names-and-addresses-for-thousands-of-soldiers-and-secret-

08 Froomkin_Name Correction copy.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

PRIVACY AS SAFETY

9/17/20 12:42 PM

165

As these incidents demonstrate, locational privacy’s value is that it
allows one to regulate access to one’s body and one’s things.116 The
examples below present a variety of illustrations of this fundamental
principle, although the dangers they protect against are not in the main as
dramatic as a deadly drone strike.
Perhaps nowhere in law is the close link between privacy and physical
safety more explicitly recognized and addressed than in the criminal
justice system. As a system designed to identify, capture, convict, and
incarcerate potentially dangerous people, the criminal-justice system
requires the ability to safeguard both witnesses and members of the
system itself from harms by suspects, defendants, convicts, and their
associates. Depending on the nature of the perceived threat, the system
achieves these goals by hiding personal information—and sometimes
hiding people.
1.

Hiding People: Witness Protection

Criminal trials in the United States are almost inevitably public. This
can expose witnesses to personal risk. For obvious reasons, the defendant
against whom the witness testifies may seek to intimidate the witness or
make an example out of them to scare off other potential witnesses.
Privacy—through, for example, witness-protection programs—is the
shield for these witnesses, keeping them safe before, during, and
after trial.117
Similarly, police safeguard the identity of confidential informants in
order to protect them from retaliation.118 This qualified privilege also
exists when the informant assisted in an undercover transaction,119 and
despite various risks associated with the use of confidential informants.120
agents/260810880-cc840165 [https://perma.cc/CY46-4RVE] (describing how fitness app could be
used to find locations, and often names and addresses, of soldiers and covert operatives).
116. In terms of the Typology, we would put this in both the Personal Zone and also in the
Proprietary Zone.
117. See generally Raneta L. Mack, The Federal Witness Protection Program Revisited and
Compared: Reshaping an Old Weapon to Meet New Challenges in the Global Crime Fighting Effort,
21 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 191 (2013); Nora V. Demleitner, Witness Protection in Criminal
Cases: Anonymity, Disguise or Other Options, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 641, 641 (1998) (noting the conflict
between ensuring witnesses’ privacy and the U.S. Constitution’s Confrontation Clause).
118. 21 AM. JUR. 2D CRIMINAL LAW § 1152 (2019) (“The prosecution in a criminal case is
generally allowed to withhold from an accused the identity of an informer.”); California v. Ortiz, No.
B158369, 2004 WL 2251202, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2004) (“The confidential informant’s
anonymity is essential to his safety and well-being.”).
119. 21 AM. JUR. 2D CRIMINAL LAW § 1152.
120. See, e.g., ABA STANDARD FOR CRIM. JUST. Standard 2.4 (noting various risks that prosecutors
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A broad form of privacy protection commonly applies to officials
involved in law enforcement and the judiciary. The State of Florida, for
example, has the broadest open-records policies in the United States121: as
the Florida Supreme Court has noted, “[a]ll governmental entities in
Florida are subject to the requirements of the Sunshine Law unless
specifically exempted[,]”122 making Florida the “Sunshine State” in more
ways than one. But even Florida has long made an exception to this right
of public access, protecting certain particularly sensitive personal
information, such as the home addresses of officials in law enforcement,
the judiciary, and other public positions whose occupants might draw the
ire of an angry and vengeful citizen.123
Courts also recognize the importance of privacy for the safety of jurors
in certain criminal cases. As part of the public’s right to see justice done,
and of the right of the defendant to a public trial, courts ordinarily make
the jurors’ identities public during or at the conclusion of a trial.124 In
should consider before relying on testimony of confidential informant).
121. Sandra F. Chance & Christina Locke, The Government-in-the-Sunshine Law Then and Now:
A Model for Implementing New Technologies Consistent with Florida’s Position as a Leader in Open
Government, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 245, 245 (2008).
122. Sarasota Citizens v. City of Sarasota, 48 So. 3d 755, 762 (Fla. 2010).
123. Florida law exempts from disclosure public records pertaining to the “home addresses,
telephone numbers, dates of birth, and photographs of active or former sworn law enforcement
personnel or of active or former civilian personnel employed by a law enforcement agency” FLA .
STAT. ANN. § 119.071(4)(d)2.a (West 2019). The particular groups covered by the exemption are
listed in the statute. See id. §§ (4)(d)2.c, l, m, r, t (providing similar protections (sometimes also
including the place of employment) for other investigatory officials); id. § (4)(d)2.d (firefighters); id.
§§ (4)(d)2.e, g, m (current and former justices of the Florida Supreme Court, (minus the bar on
photographs, but also protecting the “places of employment of the spouses and children of current or
former justices and judges; and the names and locations of schools and day care facilities attended by
the children of current or former justices and judges”) magistrates, judges, administrative law judges,
child-support hearing officers, and other adjudicators); id. §§ (4)(d)2.f, l (current or former state
prosecutors and public defenders); id. §§ (4)(d)2.h–k, o (state and local personnel managers, code
enforcers, guardians ad litem, probation officers and other workers in the prison system); id.
§ (4)(d)2.q (EMTs and paramedics); id. § (4)(d)2.s (employees of addiction treatment facilities).
124. Although practice varies, in most jurisdictions the identities of the jurors, which can be found
in the court record, are presumed to be public. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public
Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1145 (2002). Thus, circumstances in
which the jurors are impaneled anonymously or the nature of the matter leads the court to seal the
records of the case are exceptions to general practice; see also Kevin Delaney, The Right of Access to
Juror Names and Addresses, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Summer
2016), https://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-lawsummer-2016/right-access-juror-names-an [https://perma.cc/74BA-8QC7]; see also, e.g., United
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certain cases, however, courts keep the jurors’ personal information
private in order to prevent jury tampering or reprisals.125 In other words,
when necessary even strongly guarded principle of transparency of the
trial process will bow to the safety needs of jurors and their privacy
maintained even after the trial is over.
b.

Protection from Abusers

The direct connection between locational privacy and physical safety
is particularly clear in the context of domestic abuse and rape. There is a
substantial body of scholarship demonstrating that when victims of
stalking or domestic abuse regain control over their personal
information—i.e., control over their informational and especially
locational privacy—it protects their physical safety.126 “[B]attered women
are at elevated risk of violence during the pendency of prosecution,”127
leading reformers to suggest that police, prosecutors, and courts should
help victims avoid being found by their abusers.128 On the other hand, it
should also be noted that there is an important strand of scholarship that
traced the law’s unwillingness to interfere in marital battering to a belief
that this would intrude into the privacy of the home.129
In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly recognized that privacy
States v. Wecht, 537 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719 (D. Mass.
1987); Commonwealth v. Long, 922 A.2d 892, 905 (Pa. 2007) (holding that there is a qualified First
Amendment right of access to juror names but not addresses); State ex rel. Beacon J. Publ’g Co. v.
Bond, 781 N.E.2d 180 (Ohio 2002).
125. See United States v. Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Anonymous juries are
permissible when the jurors’ safety would be jeopardized by public knowledge, or the defendant has
attempted to bribe or intimidate witnesses or jurors.”); United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 574
(3d Cir. 1991) (“A trial court has discretion to permit an anonymous jury without holding an
evidentiary hearing on juror safety, if the court believes there is potential for juror apprehension.”);
Michigan v. Williams, 616 N.W.2d 710, 714 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that anonymous juries
should be used where “jurors’ safety” is an issue).
126. See, e.g., Paul S. Haberman, Before Death, We Must Part: Relocation and Protection for
Domestic Violence Victims in Volatile Divorce and Custody Situations, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 149, 159
(2005) (proposing a model for relocation of abused spouses based upon the Federal Witness
Protection Program).
127. Barbara Hart, Battered Women and the Criminal Justice System, 36 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST
625, 631 (1993) (proposing that the criminal justice system help victims prevent abusers from locating
them).
128. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Bailey, It’s Complicated: Privacy and Domestic Violence, 49 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1777, 1813 (2012) (stating that privacy can provide domestic violence victims with
more choices and “more of a voice about which solutions are appropriate for their particular
situation”).
129. See JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS
TRANSFORMING PRIVACY (2009).
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protects physical safety in this context, noting that publishing the names
of rape victims may jeopardize their “physical safety,” as victims “may
be targeted for retaliation if their names become known to
their assailants.”130
c.

Protection from Kidnappers

Knowing where your target can be found is of obvious importance to
potential kidnappers; the absence of locational privacy is what makes
kidnapping possible. Kidnapping for profit is a major criminal market,
with an estimated total turnover of up to U.S. $1.5 billion per year.131
According to Gardaworld, a kidnap for ransom and maritime piracy risk
mitigation service, most of the world is rated as “substantial,” “severe,”
or “critical” risk for kidnapping or piracy, including Mexico and much of
South America, most of Africa, India, China, and the former Soviet
Union.132 Non-terrorist kidnappers for ransom target “foreign tourists,
high-net-worth local residents insured by multinational insurers, and the
employees of foreign enterprises,”133 but also domestic middle-class
persons thought to have assets, and in Mexico even working-class
individuals.134 The process is almost institutionalized, to the point where
“in many established kidnap hotspots, ransoms are indeed surprisingly
low and stable.”135
In order to prevent kidnappers from deducing their locations, potential
targets need to avoid being tracked, and need to avoid predictable patterns
of movement such as taking the same route home every day. Locational

130. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 537 (1989); see also Kimberly W. Bacon, Florida
Sun v. B.J.F.: The Right of Privacy Collides with the First Amendment, 76 IOWA L. REV. 139, 154
n.117 (1990).
131. Anja Shortland, Governing Kidnap for Ransom: Lloyd’s as a “Private Regime”, 30
GOVERNANCE 283, 284 (2017).
132. Kidnap and Piracy Threat Forecast Map 2019, GARDAWORLD, https://www.garda.com/
kidnap-and-piracy-threat-forecast-map-2019 [https://perma.cc/EG2B-C9J9].
133. Shortland, supra note 131, at 284.
134. Sergio Ramos, Kidnapping Statistics in Mexico as of Feb 2014, HAVOSCOPE (Apr. 11, 2014),
https://web.archive.org/web/20140807051843/http://www.havocscope.com/kidnapping-statistics-inmexico-as-of-feb-2014/ [https://perma.cc/QN9M-QXE3] (reporting that “69 percent of the victims
were also considered to be non-affluent [including] . . . . middle class workers, shop owners students
and mid-level professionals”); Ken Ellingwood, Fear of Kidnapping Grips Mexico, LA TIMES (Sept.
1, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-kidnap1-2008sep01-story.html [https://perma.cc/
9YMX-V82E] (reporting that half of kidnapping victims were middle-class and that “[t]here have
been cases in which working-class families were ordered to pay as little as $500 to get a
relative back”).
135. Shortland, supra note 131, at 285.
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information is, however, a double-edged sword in kidnapping prevention:
persons who fear they or their relatives may be targets may want all family
members to carry wearable GPS devices so that rescuers can find them if
they are snatched.136 This illustrates the fact that privacy need not be
absolute to protect safety; rather, what matters is that a person be able to
control who has access to information about themselves: in this case,
where they are.
d.

Protection from Stalkers

Similar issues arise when targets seek to avoid a stalker who is not
seeking a kidnap, but rather seeks access (e.g., to a celebrity) or seeks
intimidation or violence. The Internet often makes it easy for stalkers (and
kidnappers) to obtain personal information about their potential
victims.137 This can facilitate, or even cause, online or in-person
stalking—and worse.138
The Center for Disease Control reported, in 2010, that one in three
women and one in four men had been victims of physical violence or
stalking by an intimate partner.139 Furthermore, one in six women and
5.2% of men in the United States reported experiencing “stalking
victimization at some point during their lifetime in which they felt very
fearful or believed that they or someone close to them would be harmed
or killed.”140 An earlier study stated that about one quarter of stalking
victims reported some form of cyberstalking also, such as email
or texting.141
136. Santiago Montenegro, Falling Kidnapping Rates and the Expansion of Mobile Phones in
Colombia, at 26 (Universidad de los Andes, Paper No. 12, 2009) (ISSN 1657-5334),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1544475
[https://perma.cc/7NHC-BL5U]
(attributing fall in kidnappings to ability of victims to phone for help or be traced via cellphone);
COGNIZANT, KIDNAP AND RANSOM
INSURANCE: AT AN INFLECTION POINT 10 (Oct. 2015), https://www.cognizant.com/whitepapers/Ki
dnap-and-Ransom-Insurance-At-an-Inflection-Point-codex1575.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB4R-8J9U]
(noting use of wearables as means of foiling kidnappings).
137. Cynthia Southworth, Jerry Finn, Shawndell Dawson, Cynthia Fraser & Sarah Tucker, Intimate
Partner Violence, Technology, and Stalking, 13 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 842, 849 (Aug. 2007),
https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801207302045 (noting that “[s]talkers are using . . . publicly available
free Web sites and paid information brokers to obtain personal information”).
138. Re “worse,” see infra section III.A.2.e.
139. NAT'L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NATIONAL
INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 2 (Nov. 2011).
140. Id.
141. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 224527, STALKING
VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Jan. 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ovw/
legacy/2012/08/15/bjs-stalking-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3JS-RXN8].
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Stalking can be combined with hacking personal devices or social
media accounts in order to obtain, and sometimes publicize, personal data
or intimate photos.142 New technology also facilitates stalking in a more
direct but no less disturbing manner. In an Australian case an ex-boyfriend
“allegedly weaponized simple technology and smartphone apps that
allowed him to remotely stop and start her car, control the vehicle’s
windows and track her constantly.”143 Next up, instead of having to follow
in person, stalkers will use drones to follow their victims and photograph
their every move.144
e.

Protection from Doxing and Swatting

“Doxing” (or “doxxing”145) is the malicious acquisition and publication
of non-public personal data about a target in the hopes that others will then
use the information to harass or injure the target.146 This can have tragic
results. In 1997, an anti-abortion activist named Neal Horsely published
the so-called “Nuremberg Files”: a website listing names of
approximately 200 abortion providers.147 The site listed the providers’
home addresses, phone numbers, and posted photos of them.148 In an
unsubtle encouragement to violence, the website noted which providers
were still working, which had been wounded, and which had been
killed.149 Between 1993 and 2015, at least eight abortion providers were
142. Barbara McDonald, Privacy, Princesses, and Paparazzi, 50 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 205, 235
(2005) (“[T]he publication of photographs, often taken in secret and while following a person
continuously, either visibly or surreptitiously, add greatly to the subject’s feelings of intrusion.”).
143. Reis Thebault, A Woman’s Stalker Used an App that Allowed Him to Stop, Start and Track
Her Car, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2019, 8:40 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019
/11/06/womans-stalker-used-an-app-that-allowed-him-stop-start-track-her-car/
[https://perma.cc/FQC5-CQ37].
144. See A. Michael Froomkin & Zak Colangelo, Self-Defense Against Robots and Drones, 48
CONN. L. REV. 1, 33 (2015) (suggesting that following someone with a drone could violate antistalking laws or be a civil nuisance); Kristen M.J. Thomasen, Beyond Airspace Safety: A Feminist
Perspective on Drone Privacy Regulation, 16 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 307, 323 (2018).
145. Victoria McIntyre, “Do(x) You Really Want to Hurt Me?”: Adapting IIED as a Solution to
Doxing by Reshaping Intent, 19 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 111, n.5 (2016) (“Doxing is
sometimes referred to as doxxing.”).
146. Id. at 113.
147. David S. Cohen & Krysten Connon, Strikethrough (Fatality): The Origins of Online Stalking
of Abortion Providers, SLATE (May 21, 2015, 3:38 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_p
olitics/jurisprudence/2015/05/neal_horsley_of_nuremberg_files_died_true_threats_case_reconsider
ed_by_supreme.html [https://perma.cc/N5K7-X7R4].
148. Id.; see also Hatewatch, Anti-Abortion Extremist Neal Horsely Has Died, S. POVERTY L. CTR.
(May 11, 2015), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2015/05/11/anti-abortion-extremist-nealhorsley-has-died [https://perma.cc/KR47-D9NR].
149. Hatewatch, supra note 148; see also Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1129 (11th Cir. 2002)
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murdered by anti-abortion activists.150
The harassment that follows doxing can be intense. After the 2013
Boston Marathon bombing, individuals posting on Reddit and Twitter
misidentified a number of suspects and published their personal
information, including pictures, online.151 One falsely identified person—
a twenty-two-year-old named Sunil Tripathi—became the target of
harassment and soon committed suicide.152
In a particularly powerful example, the New York Times reported in
2018 on the virtual disappearance of Dr. Christopher Filardi, an
ornithologist who, in 2015, became the target of an Internet mob after his
employer, the American Museum of Natural History, posted a photo of a
rare male forest kingfisher that he had trapped in a net while doing
zoological research in Guadalcanal.153 Word then got out that Dr. Filardi
had not just photographed the bird, but had killed it for the museum, where
he then served as the director of Pacific Programs.154 While Dr. Filardi
worked in the field without Internet access, back home the Internet
response, led by animal-rights activists, was savage vilification.155 As
matters snowballed, hackers attempted to access Dr. Filardi’s Facebook
account, which he then shut down; people also targeted his children’s
accounts. Nighttime callers phoned death threats to his wife and 3,798
people signed an online petition stating that “Chris Filardi is a disgrace
(noting that “on October 24, [1998], Horsley altered the Nuremberg Files website to graphically
reflect which abortion providers had been wounded or killed; he did so by ‘graying-out’ the wounded
and ‘striking-through’ the dead”).
150. See Tara Murtha, How Abortion Providers are ‘Living in the Crosshairs’, ROLLING STONE
(May 18, 2015, 4:03 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/how-abortionproviders-are-living-in-the-crosshairs-34307/ [https://perma.cc/M9KP-79FY]. A 2015 New York
Times article found that “[a]t least 11 people have been killed in attacks on abortion clinics in the
United States since 1993,” but that number includes not just doctors, but also receptionists and a
security guard, among others. See Liam Stack, A Brief History of Deadly Attacks on Abortion
Providers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/29/us/30abor
tion-clinic-violence.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2020).
151. Dave Lee, Boston Bombing: How Internet Detectives Got It Very Wrong, BBC (Apr. 19,
2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-22214511 [https://perma.cc/WQ5C-2GYA].
152. Traci G. Lee, The Real Story of Sunil Tripathi, the Boston Bomber Who Wasn’t, NBC NEWS
(June 22, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/wrongly-accused-boston-bombingsunil-tripathys-story-now-being-told-n373141 [https://perma.cc/434E-CB42]; see also Nellie
Bowles, How ‘Doxxing’ Became a Mainstream Tool in the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/technology/doxxing-protests.html (last visited Mar.
9, 2020).
153. Kirk W. Johnson, The Ornithologist the Internet Called a Murderer, N.Y. TIMES (June 15,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/15/opinion/sunday/moustached-kingfisher-internetharassment.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2020).
154. Id.
155. Id.
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and frankly does not deserve to breathe another breath.”156 When Dr.
Filardi returned to work in New York, the police advised him to sneak in
via a back door. When he published an essay defending his work,
commentators called him a murderer.157 Eventually, Dr. Filardi changed
his job, scrubbed his online profile, and made himself hard to find.158
Most members of online mobs live far from their targets and thus they
limit themselves to verbal abuse. Unfortunately, publication of personal
locational information—whether self-published or the product of
doxing—can lead to “swatting.” This occurs when someone calls the
police and falsely reports that a hostage situation or other scenario calling
for a SWAT team—i.e., heavily armed police—is taking place at the
target’s home. The police then raid the home, an event that puts the
unsuspecting inhabitants at risk.159 In one case, the Wichita Police SWAT
team responded to a call reporting a hostage-taking and—in
circumstances that remain opaque—shot and killed the target.160 While
swatting commonly arises from private vendettas, victims include a
prominent security researcher who angered an online doxer161 and, more
recently, three separate events targeted survivors of the Marjory Stoneman
Douglas high-school shooting, who had each become nationally
recognized gun-control activists.162
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See id. (describing the effort required to contact Dr. Filardi).
159. Swatting, LEXICO OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/swatting
[https://perma.cc/S929-XLUM] (“Swatting” is defined as “[t]he action or practice of making a hoax call to
the emergency services in an attempt to bring about the dispatch of a large number of armed police officers
to a particular address.”).
160. Emanuella Grinberg, Shooting Death in Video Game Leads to a Real One in Kansas, CNN
(Jan. 30, 2018, 7:24 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/30/us/kansas-swatting-deathaffidavit/index.html [https://perma.cc/7CZT-W9D5].
161. See Brian Krebs, The World Has No Room for Cowards, KREBSONSECURITY (Mar. 13, 2013,
3:15 PM), https://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/03/the-world-has-no-room-for-cowards/
[https://perma.cc/6EUG-GPBN] (describing a SWATing incident at his home); Brian Krebs,
SWATing Incidents Tied to ID Theft?, KREBSONSECURITY (Apr. 13, 2013, 4:47 PM), https://krebso
nsecurity.com/2013/04/swatting-incidents-tied-to-id-theft-sites/ [https://perma.cc/YVS6-D29G]
(describing research identifying possible culprit); Brian Krebs, Serial Swatter, Stalker and Doxer Mir
Islam Gets Just 1 Year in Jail, KREBSONSECURITY (July 16, 2016, 8:32 PM), https://krebsonsecurit
y.com/2016/07/serial-swatter-stalker-and-doxer-mir-islam-gets-just-1-year-in-jail/
[https://perma.cc/728Z-2X3P] (reporting on trial of person partly responsible for SWATing Krebs).
162. Erika Pesantes, Swatting Hoax Targets #NeverAgain Activists, SUN SENTINEL (June 8, 2018,
9:45
AM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/parkland/florida-school-shooting/fl-sbswatting-hogg-kasky-20180608-story.html [https://perma.cc/C8MH-PXJM] (reporting swatting
attack on David Hogg and Cameron Kasky, and noting the presence of family members in Kasky’s
home); Jeff Tavss & Alex Finnie, Family of Stoneman Douglas Student Advocate David Hogg
‘Swatted’ at Home, ABC NEWS 10 (June 5, 2018, 6:13 PM), https://web.archive.org/web/20190331
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Most recently, parents of children who survived the December 2012
Sandy Hook elementary-school massacre issued an open letter describing
the attacks they suffered after the tragedy:
Conspiracy groups and anti-government provocateurs began
making claims on Facebook that the massacre was a hoax, that
the murdered were so-called “crisis actors” and that their
audience should rise up to “find out the truth” about our families.
These claims and calls to action spread across Facebook like
wildfire and, despite our pleas, were protected by Facebook.
....
We have endured online, telephone, and in-person harassment,
abuse, and death threats. In fact, one of the abusers was sentenced
to jail for credible death threats that she admitted in court she had
uttered because she believed in online content created by these
“fringe groups”. [Sic] In order to protect ourselves and our
surviving children, we have had to relocate numerous times.
These groups use social media, including Facebook, to “hunt” us,
posting our home address and videos of our house online. We are
currently living in hiding.163
When telephone books were the main means for ordinary people to find
out where others lived, anyone wishing to could ask the telephone
company to keep them out of the book by paying a small fee for an
unpublished or even unlisted (not available via directory assistance)
number.164 Between the Internet and modern consumer data bases, hiding
one’s home address nowadays has become nearly impossible. As a result,
anyone who has the misfortune to become an involuntary public figure is
at risk.165
133339/https://www.local10.com/news/parkland-school-shooting/family-of-stoneman-douglasadvocate-david-hogg-swatted-at-home [https://perma.cc/5UPB-QP7A] (noting there were no
casualties in the David Hogg incident as the house was empty at the time); Sharon Aron Baron, Police
Respond to Threat Against Parkland Activist and Bomb Scare at Walmart, CORAL SPRINGS TALK
(June 11, 2018), http://coralspringstalk.com/police-respond-to-threat-against-19571-19571
[https://perma.cc/86DJ-SCPK] (reporting swatting incident targeting Sarah Chadwick).
163. Leonard Pozner & Veronique De La Rosa, An Open Letter to Mark Zuckerberg: Our Child
Died at Sandy Hook – Why Let Facebook Lies Hurt Us Even More?, THE GUARDIAN (July 25, 2018,
6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/25/mark-zuckerberg-facebooksandy-hook-parents-open-letter [https://perma.cc/27LH-CQ5J].
164. See Peter F. Kriete, Caller ID and the Great Privacy Debate: Whose Phone Call is it,
Anyway?, 97 DICK. L. REV. 357, 366 (1993).
165. For example, after U.C. Berkeley law professor John Yoo appeared on a Fox News show and
accused Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman of “espionage,” Vindman’s lawyer alleged that “LTC Vindman
and his family have been forced to examine options, including potentially moving onto a military
base, in order to ensure their physical security in the face of threats rooted in the falsehood that Fox
News originated.” Letter from David Pressman, Bois Schiller Flexner LLP, to Lily Fu Claffee,

08 Froomkin_Name Correction copy.docx (Do Not Delete)

174
f.

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

9/17/20 12:42 PM

[Vol. 95:141

Protection of Beneficiaries of Good Fortune (Lottery Winners)

Good fortune can also be a source of both physical and economic
danger. The downside of good fortune emerges most starkly in the case of
winners of large lottery payments. While winning the lottery may seem to
be an occasion for celebration, it can also be the source of harassment and
pain.166 State lotteries historically required that winners of large prizes
agree to have their names and often photos publicized.167 The policy
serves the twin goals of publicity for the lottery and transparency as to
who is winning—the latter being designed to make it more difficult for
insiders to manipulate the lottery results. In a break with this trend, several
states now allow winners to be anonymous, or allow a period of
anonymity,168 thus allowing winners to prepare for the tsunami of what a
New Hampshire court called “solicitation and harassment.”169
Executive VP and General Counsel of Fox News, at 2–3 (Nov. 20, 2019),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6555531-VIndman-Boies-LETTER.html
[https://perma.cc/9ZP3-FACA]. The U.S. Army issued a statement that it was providing “security
assistance” to Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman in order “to ensure that he and his family are
properly protected.” Luis Martinez, Army Providing Security Assistance to Vindman, a Key
Witness in Impeachment Hearings, ABC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2019, 11:51 AM), https://abcnews.go.co
m/Politics/army-providing-security-assistance-vindman-keywitnessimpeachment/story?
id=67137282 [https://perma.cc/YTW4-NPH9].
166. See Jen Doll, A Treasury of Terribly Sad Stories of Lotto Winners, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 30, 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/03/terribly-sad-true-stories-lotto-winners/329903/
[https://perma.cc/4R92-5Q2A].
167. See Frank D. LoMonte, Who’s Willing to Bet That State Lotteries are Free of Manipulation?, WASH.
POST (June 12, 2018, 3:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/whos-willing-to-bet-thatstate-lotteries-are-free-of-manipulation/2018/06/12/f9832e50-6dc0-11e8-afd5778aca903bbe_story.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2020). Of the states permitting some form of anonymity listed
infra note 168, Kansas was the first to permit winners to remain anonymous. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-8720
(2019); see also Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 246 (1991) (requiring no disclosure of winner’s identity without
written permission).
168. David Pitt, Associated Press, Should Lottery Winners’ Names be Secret? States Debate Issue,
BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/ap-should-lottery-winners-namesbe-secret-states-debate-issue-2016-1
[https://perma.cc/DPL4-NWKX]
(“Delaware, Kansas,
Maryland, North Dakota, Ohio and South Carolina allow winners to remain anonymous. A growing
number of other states, including Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts and Vermont, will award
prizes to a trust and allow a trustee–usually an attorney–to collect without disclosing the name of the
ticket holder. States including Illinois and Oregon have made exceptions to their policy of disclosure
when winners demonstrate a high risk of harm.”). More recently, Mississippi, North Carolina, and
West Virginia have passed similar laws. See Mississippi, MISS . CODE ANN. § 27-115-43 (2018); 2018
Miss. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 2 § 22 (no disclosure without written permission), North Carolina, N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18C-132 (2019) (winners of over $50 million may remain confidential for 90 days
upon request); see also 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws 142 § 5; West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 29-22-15a
(2018); 2018 W. Va. Acts 884.
169. Jane Doe v. New Hampshire Lottery Comm’n, No. 226-2018-CV-00036, at 5–6
(Hillsborough Sup. Ct. S.D.N.H. Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.courts.state.nh.us/caseinfo/pdf/civi
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Harms to lottery winners are surprisingly common. Lottery winners
have, on several occasions, suffered from violence and extortion. In one
case, a winner’s brother hired a hit man to kill him.170 In another case, a
Florida man vanished three years after winning $31 million, only to be
found under a concrete slab a few years later.171 One pair of Irish lottery
winners went into hiding to escape extortion by an armed gang.172 With
some regularity, winners are targets for theft and fraud.173 Even when
there is no violence, winners face multiple demands for money from
friends, relatives, and strangers; others, surprisingly, face various forms
of contempt or mockery.174
B.

Intellectual Privacy

Intellectual privacy comprises a person’s interest in the privacy of his
or her personal thoughts, opinions, and beliefs. Protecting intellectual
privacy ensures that one is free to be oneself—at least in one’s own
mind.175 Whereas bodily privacy is concerned with the physical aspect of
the individual, intellectual privacy is concerned with the mental,
emotional, or spiritual aspects of the individual.176 Intellectual privacy is
less tangible than some other privacy rights, and thus often is seen in
conjunction with those other rights, like associational and decisional
privacies.177 Although difficult to enforce as an independent right, the
freedom to believe and think whatever a person wishes is fundamental to
and a necessary condition of many of the other extant privacy rights. For
example, there is a close connection between intellectual privacy and the
freedom to express one’s beliefs or thoughts, which in turn has large
implications for political freedom.

l/DoevNHLC/031218doevNHLC.pdf [https://perma.cc/AWW3-BJSG].
170. Doll, supra note 166.
171. Abraham Shakespeare Won the Lottery, Then Lost it All, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan. 24, 2009),
https://www.tampabay.com/news/From-the-archives-Abraham-Shakespeare-won-the-lottery-thenlost-it-all_164452713/ [https://perma.cc/W728-WD7W].
172. Alan Murdoch, Lottery Winners Forced to Go Into Hiding After Extortion Attempts, THE
INDEPENDENT (Apr. 16, 1994, 12:02 AM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/lottery-winnersforced-to-go-into-hiding-after-extortion-attempts-1370272.html [https://perma.cc/H5VT-CCB7].
173. Id.
174. Doll, supra note 166 (describing “ugly” comments aimed at one winner by “lotto snobs” and
at another winner for being supposedly too old to enjoy the winnings).
175. NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY (2015); Koops et al., supra note 13, at 567.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 555.
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Protection of Psychological Safety

In addition to its value to physical safety, privacy—particularly
intellectual privacy—helps create a zone of psychological safety.
However, as with physical safety, the relationship between privacy and
psychological wellbeing can be somewhat double-edged: too much
privacy can become negative isolation and enforced privacy can be the
product of ostracism or solitary confinement. Indeed, privacy only means
something in relation to others—privacy was not a concern for Robinson
Crusoe, but rather the opposite. While aware of these caveats, here we
concentrate on the positive side of the relationship.
There is now extensive evidence regarding the psychological costs of
feeling threatened. For example, the stress of being stalked “can lead to
severe depression, helplessness, and mental dysfunction.”178 In Winston v.
Lee,179 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized what may seem obvious to
many: that privacy contributes to making people feel safer from physical
harm.180 The Court noted that intrusions such as the police entering a
person’s living room,181 eavesdropping on someone’s telephone calls,182
or forcing a person to accompany officers to the police station183
“typically do not injure the physical person of the individual” but
nonetheless “damage the individual’s sense of . . . security.”184
2.

Psychological Safety Under Pervasive Surveillance

As facial recognition becomes ubiquitous, more intrusive surveillance
is on the horizon and its psychological impact will be correspondingly
greater. Today, stalking and individualized intimidation are in the main
exceptional, not mass phenomena. Systemic tracing and retention of
electronic communications is a mass phenomenon, but at least until
recently it seems to have remained largely invisible to most people in the
United States, Canada, and Europe. Similarly, while credit and other
scoring systems are prevalent, their effects are concentrated in the
economic sector. For a long time, credit scores were used primarily for
178. Brenda S. Sanford, Stalking is Now Illegal: Will a Paper Law Make a Difference?, 10 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 409, 430 (1993) (quoting Rachel L. Jones, His Obsession, Her Terror, DETROIT
FREE PRESS at 4H (Aug. 23, 1992)).
179. 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985).
180. 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985).
181. Id. at 761–62 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)).
182. Id. at 762 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
183. Id. (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)).
184. Lee, 470 U.S. at 762.
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credit determinations.185 More recently, landlords and employers have
begun to use credit scores as inputs to their decision-making, and there
have even been reports of dating applications matching by credit score.186
Current levels of surveillance and control are only the beginning. Much
greater surveillance is coming. The Chinese government may currently be
the world leader in its experiment with social scoring mechanisms,187 but
the use of “reputation mechanisms in law, regulations, and governance is
not a uniquely Chinese phenomenon”; rather it “has been underway
globally.”188 Privacy will achieve new salience when people begin to fear
that every action they take both online and in person will be stored and
scored. Whether everyone will react as if they were being stalked, or if
mass observation and scoring will become a new normal, remains to
be seen.
C.

Protection of Spatial Privacy

Spatial privacy involves a person’s interest in the privacy of particular
physical locations, primarily those the person considers intimate.189 The
most common examples would be the expectation of privacy a person has
in his or her own room, office, or home. Spatial privacy focuses on
excluding unwanted intrusion or inspection in an area a person identifies
as theirs. Often, spatial privacy is associated with the intimate relations or
family life that occur in the home, such as peeping in a bedroom
window.190 The criminal procedure concept of a “reasonable expectation
of privacy,” and the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable
search and seizure, also originate from this privacy right.191

185. See Jonathan Weinberg, ‘Know Everything that can be Known About Everybody’: The Birth
of the Credit Report, 63 VILL. L. REV. 431, 434–35 (2018).
186. Online Dating Site Matches Users by Their Credit Score, CBSPHILLY (Apr. 5, 2017, 8:44
AM), https://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2017/04/05/dating-credit-score/ [https://perma.cc/FU3XQF9P]; see also Suzanne Wooley, Your Credit Score Could Make or Break Your Love Life,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 21, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-21/ahigh-credit-score-can-make-you-look-sexy-on-dating-apps [https://perma.cc/PQ77-ZTAN]
(reporting that financial responsibility “was ranked as a very or extremely important quality in a
potential mate by 69 percent of the 2,000 online daters surveyed”).
187. Xin Dai, Toward a Reputation State: The Social Credit System Project of China (June 10,
2018) (on file with Ocean University of China and Peking University Law School), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3193577 [https://perma.cc/3VMX-G7Q7].
188. Id. at 2; see also Lior J. Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal
Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667 (2008).
189. Koops et al., supra note 13, at 567.
190. Id. at 500.
191. Id. at 515–16.
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Protection of Decisional Privacy

Decisional privacy consists of a person’s interest in the privacy of
personal decisions, primarily those relating to intimate relationships.
Decisional privacy focuses on the idea that people should have the right
to privacy regarding choices relating to sexuality, relationships, and
family.192 While we are not prepared to make or defend the claim that
reproductive autonomy is an aspect of “privacy” as such, some examples
cited by scholars include the right to make uncoerced choices about sexual
orientation, contraceptive use, and abortion.193 So understood, the value
of decisional privacy is reflected in court decisions that protect family life
and personal decisions from government intrusion; consider, for instance,
Roe v. Wade,194 Griswold v. Connecticut,195 and the constitutionally
guaranteed rights to a family’s privacy.196
1.

Avoidance of Shame (and Blackmail)

Decisional privacy is reduced to the extent one is subject to external
pressures such as shame or blackmail. One significant, although perhaps
sometimes dubious, aspect of privacy is that it protects against the
observation of actions that may cause shame. Society appears to be of two
minds on this point. On the one hand, there are actions that are both
shameful and criminal, and the protection of these is no virtue. Other,
legal, activities may be immoral and embarrassing or have painful
consequences if discovered; for instance, having an affair that might cause
a divorce if discovered. However, there is also a substantial class of
(usually legal) actions that some or all people may find shameful to have
observed, and for which society either tolerates or even supports the
average person’s desire to not have those actions observed. Examples of
legal but don’t-flaunt-it activities include sex (generally a public-order
offense if done in public, but not in private) and defecation (which is why
there commonly are doors on toilet stalls). Furthermore, there are still
people who would not want their sexual orientation or religious or
political beliefs to be known by others.
In each of these cases, the Typology’s overlay of informational privacy
reflects its role in protecting intimate aspects of privacy by guarding not
192. Id. at 567–68.
193. Id. at 521.
194. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
195. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
196. Koops et al., supra note 13, at 521.
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just against shame, a potentially painful emotion,197 but perhaps also
against blackmail. The more surveillance people are subject to, the more
they will either have to conform their behavior to social norms198 or the
more they will have to risk either shame or demand for hush money.
E.

Protection of Communicational Privacy

Communicational privacy involves a person’s interest in restricting
unwanted access to their communication with other individuals.
Communicational privacy includes the protection of speech, documents,
phone calls, and electronic communications such as emails or text
messages.199 In U.S. law, this privacy interest finds its most evident
expression in the First Amendment’s protections of speech, religious
liberty, and the freedom of association, but, as described in this section, it
is also reflected in other doctrines and practices. Which zone of privacy
these communications protections fall into under the Typology ranges
from the intimate to the public zones, depending on the correspondent, the
subject, and the context.200
Governments today are increasingly regulating communications
technology to require both traceability of communications and storage of
metadata and even content by information intermediaries.201 The
consequence is that any user of email, web services, or cell phones must
act as if they are being monitored. Worse, with data retention, the
government’s monitoring need not be in real time, but can be applied
retrospectively for months or years. The consequences are potentially
severe, and can lead to political repression—or self-censorship.202 This is
not controversial: in Bartnicki v. Vopper,203 for example, both the majority
and the dissent agreed that “privacy of communication is essential if
197. See June P. Tangney, The Self-Conscious Emotions: Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment and Pride
in HANDBOOK OF COGNITION AND EMOTION 541 (Tim Dalgleish & Mick J. Power, eds., 2005); Jerry
Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1212–18, 1260
(1998) (noting that informational privacy helps individuals avoid the embarrassment that
accompanies the disclosure of certain personal details).
198. See Margot Kaminsky & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amendment
Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465, 518 (2015).
199. Koops et al., supra note 13, at 524, 567.
200. We address evidentiary privileges below in section III.H. As noted there, many evidentiary
privileges, such as the clergy-penitent privilege, can be characterized as protecting communications
in the Typology’s semi-private zone.
201. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Lessons Learned Too Well: Anonymity in a Time of
Surveillance, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 95, 97 (2017).
202. See Kaminsky & Witnov, supra note 198, at 518.
203. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
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[democratic] citizens are to think and act creatively and constructively”
because fear of being monitored can inhibit the willingness to voice
critical ideas.204
1.

Shield Laws

The proliferation of shield laws for journalists in most of the states in
the United States demonstrates that legislatures understand how privacy
both enhances safety in the semi-private zone, and enhances liberty
more generally.
Shield laws respond to a problem caused by the clash between the value
of a public informed by journalists able to rely on confidential sources and
the legal system’s focus on acquiring information relating to legal
violations. “The United States public consistently relies on press coverage
of leaked material to hold government actors accountable for
controversial operations.”205 Yet despite the strong protections of the First
Amendment, when it comes to being required to testify in court, or before
grand juries, reporters have no more right to refuse than any other
citizen.206 Consequently, at common law, it was not improper for a
prosecutor to attempt to require a journalist to disclose a source who had
revealed information about a crime, although journalistic ethics required
that reporters nonetheless protect their sources, even at pain of being jailed
for contempt for their failure to testify.207
Thirty-one U.S. states have chosen to temper this rule with so-called
“shield laws” that create a legal privilege for journalists.208 In seventeen
204. Id. at 533 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 543 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See generally RICHARDS, supra note 175.
205. Elizabeth L. Robinson, Post-Sterling Developments: The Mootness of the Federal Reporter’s
Privilege Debate, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1314, 1314 (2017).
206. Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Privilege of Newsgatherer Against Disclosure of
Confidential Sources or Information, 99 A.L.R. FED. 3D Art. 37 (2018) (“Traditionally, a
newsgatherer, in the absence of a statute or court rule to the contrary, has no privilege to conceal and
may be compelled to disclose in a legal proceeding before a court, grand jury, or other governmental
bodies, the confidential information or the identity of a confidential source of information obtained
by him in his professional capacity.”).
207. Joel G. Weinberg, Supporting the First Amendment: A National Reporter’s Shield Law, 31
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 149, 156–58 (2006).
208. Id. at 173. The U.S. Justice Department also has special guidelines requiring personal
authorization from the Attorney General to subpoena a reporter. The guidelines state that such
subpoenas should only be authorized after “all reasonable alternative attempts have been made to
obtain the information from alternative sources[,]” and the Department has attempted to negotiate
with the journalist. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2019). The guidelines, however, are only advisory, not binding.
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 n.41 (1972) (noting that guidelines need not be followed
in all cases).
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other states, the courts have judicially created a qualified privilege
allowing reporters to protect their sources.209 While these rules vary, and
do not apply to federal investigations and prosecutions,
[i]n almost all the jurisdictions, the reporter’s privilege applies in
the grand jury context. Over half of the state shield statutes render
absolute a reporter’s privilege not to disclose confidential
sources, and in virtually all of the remaining state statutes, the
standard for piercing the reporter’s privilege is high, requiring
more than simple relevance to the proceeding. State shield laws
provide varying scopes of protection. In fourteen States, the
state’s highest court or an intermediate appellate court has
recognized a reporter’s privilege. Lower courts in three States
have recognized a reporter’s privilege. Only Wyoming and
Hawaii have not adopted some form of reporter’s privilege.210
Because “[r]eporters cannot function without confidential sources,”211
and because the public has an interest in the free flow of information, U.S.
state authorities—and in a much more limited fashion, federal ones
too212—have recognized the importance of protecting the identity of those
sources. Here, privacy serves the security of the sources—and, arguably,
the long-run security of all participants in democracy who otherwise
would have to subsist on an information diet even more tightly controlled
by governmental authorities.
The reporter’s privilege to protect confidential sources is now anchored
in international law. In 2011, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee adopted an interpretation of freedom of expression that
included a journalistic privilege, as recognized in Article 19 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.213 Prior to this

209. See Weinberg, supra note 207, at 173–75.
210. Id. (emphasis omitted). Hawaii subsequently enacted a shield law, but it lapsed in 2013. See
Jack Komperda, Hawaii Shield Law Will Expire After Lawmakers Unable to Reconcile Competing
Bills, REPS. COMMITTEE FREEDOM PRESS (May 3, 2013), https://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-lawresources/news/hawaii-shield-law-will-expire-after-lawmakers-unable-reconcile-compe
[https://perma.cc/HH7K-FW7F].
211. Scott Neinas, A Skinny Shield Is Better: Why Congress Should Propose A Federal Reporters'
Shield Statute That Narrowly Defines Journalists, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 225, 227 (2008).
212. The U.S. Supreme Court has not recognized a reporter’s privilege, with its only relevant
pronouncement being the somewhat opaque result in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972),
which held that journalists, like other citizens, have no immunity from grand-jury subpoenas. Id.
However, “[m]ost federal circuits recognize a qualified journalist’s privilege not to identify a
confidential source.” David Abramowicz, Calculating the Public Interest in Protecting Journalists’
Confidential Sources, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1949, 1949 (2008).
213. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM., INT’L COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, gen. cmt.
34, para. 45 (Nov. 29, 2011); see generally Edward L. Carter, “Not to Disclose Information Sources”:
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pronouncement, the European Court of Human Rights (on multiple
occasions), the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone had
each recognized some form of reporters’ privilege.214
2.

Protection of Whistleblowers

In order to encourage people to report fraud and other violations of
trust, U.S. law provides for a number of protections designed to safeguard
the identity of informants known as whistleblowers. U.S. law also
contains a large number of statutory prohibitions of retaliation against
whistleblowers, for example prohibitions on firing an employee who
reported an offense,215 but, necessarily, those only apply if the person
retaliating knows the identity of the whistleblower. These rules, like those
protecting witnesses and informants in criminal cases, are designed to
encourage the reporting of misdeeds by those with knowledge of the same
while at the same time protecting the whistleblower from the danger of
physical or economic retaliation.216 A whistleblower protection scheme
figured prominently in the revelation of the Ukraine scandal that set off a
presidential impeachment investigation in October 2019.217
The clearest example of a statutory anti-retaliation policy may be the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) program to encourage and
reward whistleblowing. Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act,218 the SEC
Journalistic Privilege Under Article 19 of ICCPR, 22 COMM. L. & POL’Y 399 (2017).
214. See Carter, supra note 213.
215. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012).
216. See Whistleblower 10949-13W v. Comm’r, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1475, 1475 (2014)
(“Proceeding anonymously is necessary to protect the whistleblower’s professional reputation,
economic interests and personal safety.”); Anonymous v. Comm’r, 127 T.C. 89, 94 (2006) (holding
that risk of “severe physical harm” to taxpayer and taxpayer’s family outweighed general public
interest in knowing taxpayer’s identity); U.S. Navy-Marine Corps. Court of Military Review v.
Carlucci, 26 M.J. 328, 335 n.9 (C.M.A. 1988) (recognizing “the importance of encouraging and
protecting whistleblowers” through preserving their anonymity); see generally U.S. Tax Ct. R. 345
(“A petitioner in a whistleblower action may move the Court for permission to proceed anonymously,
if appropriate.”); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West 2019) (requiring the audit committees of issuers of
securities to implement internal procedures that facilitate and encourage “anonymous”
whistleblowing by employees about “questionable accounting or auditing matters”).
217. See Annie Karni & Nicholas Fandos, Legal Team Says it Represents a Second Whistle-Blower
Over
Trump
and
Ukraine,
N.Y.
TIMES
(last
updated
Oct.
11,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/06/us/politics/second-whistleblower-trump-ukraine.html
(last
visited
Mar.
9,
2020);
Michael
D.
Shear,
Highlights:
WhistleBlower Complaint Goes to House as Ukraine Phone Call Gets Released, N.Y. TIMES (last updated
Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/25/us/politics/trump-impeachment.html (last
visited Mar. 9, 2020).
218. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
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offers whistleblowers219 in the financial industry the prospect of monetary
bounties220 and the promise of confidentiality.221 Subject to limited
exceptions,222 whistleblowers may require the SEC to protect their
identity, and even keep confidential the information that the
whistleblower reveals if such information can reasonably be expected to
reveal the identity of a whistleblower if made public.223 As one
commentator put it, “[t]his is a very important protection for prospective
whistleblowers” because otherwise not only their current job, but also
their standing in their community and their future employment prospects,
could be “ruined”—making the promise of confidentiality “more
important than the monetary reward.”224
Indeed, guaranteeing anonymity for whistleblowers
allows individuals to come forward who would otherwise remain
silent for fear of reprisals. In so doing it promotes the public
welfare which may be subverted by abuses of power by
government officials, or the public safety, which may be
threatened by dangerous practices of private industry. It may also
promote honesty and accountability among managers who know
they will find it difficult to conceal their indulgences.225
Partly as a result of keeping whistleblowers’ identities secret, the SEC’s
program has been very successful:
The SEC whistleblower program has proved to be popular with
1376, 1841–49 (2010).
219. Exactly who should qualify as a protected “whistleblower” is a subject of debate. See Carmen
Germaine, 9th Circ. Says Dodd-Frank Protects Non-SEC Whistleblowers, LAW360 (Mar. 8, 2017,
3:17 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/899680/9th-circ-says-dodd-frank-protects-non-secwhistleblowers [https://perma.cc/CQU7-QDCS]. But the issue need not detain us here.
220. Alexander Hall, Whistling Different Tunes: A Comprehensive Look at The Future of
Whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank, 86 UMKC L. REV. 681, 685 (2018). In order to be eligible for
bounties, the information given to the SEC must have come from the relator’s own knowledge, and
not have been available from publicly available sources. Furthermore, the information has to be strong
enough to substantially influence—or cause the agency staff to create—an investigation. See Ronald
H. Filler & Jerry W. Markham, Whistleblowers—A Case Study in the Regulatory Cycle for Financial
Services, 12 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 311, 314–15 (2018).
221. Hall, supra note 220, at 686. The SEC’s rules also provide for protection against retaliation if
the whistleblower’s identity is revealed. Id. at 686–87.
222. See Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2)(B)–(C) (2012) (primarily dealing with criminal
referrals, for example, to a grand jury).
223. Id. § 78u-6(h)(2); see also Hall, supra note 220, at 686.
224. Hall, supra note 220, at 686.
225. Frederick A. Elliston, Anonymity and Whistleblowing, 1 J. BUS. ETHICS 167, 172, 176 (1982)
(“In many cases [whistleblowers] are fired or demoted, transferred to unattractive assignments or
locales, ostracized by their peers and cast into psychological and professional isolation.” (emphasis
omitted)).
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tipsters. In fiscal year 2016, the SEC received over 4,200
whistleblower tips, a forty percent increase over the first year of
the program which began in 2012. By extrapolating these figures,
it appears that the SEC has probably received over 10,000 tips
since the implementation of its whistleblower program. By June
2017, the SEC had awarded over $175 million in bounties to
whistleblowers. Several of the SEC’s bounty payments were in
the millions of dollars, including awards of $83 million, $30
million, $22 million, $20 million, $17 million and $4 million.226
If nothing else, this suggests that privacy as safety has real value. Indeed,
the whistleblower program received a backhanded compliment from
Republican appointees to the SEC who recently proposed to weaken it by
lessening the awards offered to people who disclose major widespread
frauds.227
3.

Encryption

Cryptography, skillfully employed, prevents the interception of
communications—shared secrets—by unauthorized third parties; it also
protects recorded secrets, such as diaries.228 Both functions are key aspects
of privacy.229 As Kim Lane Scheppele explains,
Without the ability to keep secrets, individuals lose the capacity
to distinguish themselves from others, to maintain independent
lives, to be complete and autonomous persons . . . . This does not
mean that a person actually has to keep secrets to be autonomous,
just that she must possess the ability to do so. The ability to keep

226. Filler & Markham, supra note 220, at 315.
227. Whistleblower Program Rules, 83 Fed. Reg. 34,702 (proposed July 20, 2018) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). The proposal increases the awards for disclosure of small retail fraud, but
commentators (and the two dissenters in the three-to-two commission vote) described overall effect
as designed to undermine the effectiveness of the program and potentially contrary to the enabling
statute. See, e.g., Nicholas Piwonka, Proposed SEC Rule Will Hurt Whistleblower Program,
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION BLOG (July
5,
2018),
https://www.whistleblowersblog.org/2018/07/articles/dodd-frank-whistleblowers/proposed-sec-rulewill-hurt-whistleblower-program/ [https://perma.cc/88CT-2WYY] (discussing how decreasing the
potential size of a payout may disincentivize whistleblowers); Yves Smith, SEC Knifes Its
Whistleblower
Program, NAKED CAPITALISM (July
9,
2018),
https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2018/07/sec-knifes-whistleblower-program.html
[https://perma.cc/YB4Q-DVBG] (arguing that the amendments will severely undermine program by
reducing incentive needed to persuade most potential whistleblowers to speak out).
228. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY (1994); A. Michael Froomkin, The
Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709
(1995).
229. KIM L. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 302 (1988).
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secrets implies the ability to disclose secrets selectively, and so
the capacity for selective disclosure at one’s own discretion is
important to individual autonomy as well.230
Cryptography also enables strong electronic authentication, making
impersonation and identity theft more difficult.231 With the help of
intermediaries such as providers of Virtual Private Networks (VPN),
cryptography also makes online tracking more difficult.232
Thus, encryption can enable anonymous speech,233 and contributes to
the freedom of association234 as well as to intellectual privacy.235 To the
extent that cryptography helps mask a user’s location, there is also a link
between communications privacy and physical privacy.236
Currently, U.S. residents remain free to use cryptographic protections,
despite a twenty-five-year on-again off-again campaign by law
enforcement and intelligence agencies to enact limits on strong
cryptography in order to enhance the government’s ability to acquire
communications intelligence.237 Indeed, encryption is an increasingly
230. Id. (footnote omitted).
231. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic
Commerce, 75 OR. L. REV. 49 (1996).
232. A VPN prevents tracking by the user’s Internet service provider; unfortunately, many webbased Internet activities still create vulnerabilities via more elaborate tracking and tracing
technologies
such
as
supercookies,
see,
for
example,
Nicholas
Jackson, The Next Online Privacy Battle: Powerful Supercookies, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 18, 201
1), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/08/the-next-online-privacy-battlepowerful-supercookies/243800/ [https://perma.cc/LP4R-M6YD] and online ‘fingerprinting’, see
Electronic Frontier Foundation, Panopticlick, https://panopticlick.eff.org [https://perma.cc/FXJ7MBR4]. Phone-based internet activities also expose the user to any vulnerabilities introduced by the
apps on their phones.
233. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with
Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 U. PITT. J. L. & COM. 395 (1996) (explaining
how encryption allows individuals to communicate anonymously over the internet); Froomkin,
Anonymity, supra note 56 (explaining how encryption works and how, by enabling anonymously
speech over the internet, encryption enhances freedom of speech).
234. See infra section III.F.
235. See supra section III.B.
236. Koops et al, supra note 13 (noting that protection of informational privacy relating to personal
data “is also a precondition to protecting the underlying physical privacy type”).
237. See SUSAN LANDAU, LISTENING IN: CYBERSECURITY IN AN INSECURE AGE (2018); A.
Michael Froomkin, It Came From Planet Clipper: The Battle Over Crytopgraphic Key “Escrow,”
1996 U. CHI. L. F. 15 (1996); A. Michael Froomkin, From Anonymity to Identification, 1 J. REG. &
SELF-REG. 121, 123–25, 129–31 (2015) [hereinafter Froomkin, From Anonymity]; Jim Baker,
Rethinking
Encryption, LAWFARE (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/rethinkingencryption [https://perma.cc/26GG-QB3F]; Joseph Marks, The Cybersecurity 202: Attorney General
Barr
fires
up the encryption debate (July 24, 2019), WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/pow
erpost/paloma/the-cybersecurity-202/2019/07/24/the-cybersecurity-202-attorney-general-barr-fires-
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standard part of information and communications technologies: it’s built
into iPhones,238 web browsers,239 and is the default for popular
web pages.240
F.

Associational Privacy

Associational privacy involves the freedom to choose with whom one
wishes to interact.241 This form of privacy ordinarily involves multiple
people; the right to associational privacy exists to guarantee social
relationships outside the home, and the freedom of assembly.242
Associational privacy can also refer to the expectation of privacy that
groups have in protecting their information from outsiders, as well as the
right to exclude people from their group.243
U.S. courts have long recognized the connection between privacy and
the constitutional right to free association, itself a cornerstone of the
viability of a liberal democracy. In the course of litigation designed to
prevent the NAACP from operating a chapter in Alabama, the Alabama
state government obtained an ex parte order directing the NAACP to
produce, inter alia, records containing the names and addresses of all of
its Alabama members.244 In a unanimous opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court
overturned the production order, noting that “immunity from state
scrutiny of [the NAACP’s] membership lists which the Association
claims on behalf of its members is here so related to the right of [the
NAACP’s] members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and
to associate freely with others in doing so as to come within the protection
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”245 As the Court stated,
It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of
affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as
effective a restraint on freedom of association as the forms of
up-the-encryptiondebate/5d3789a388e0fa1454f7fea1/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2020).
238. See Why Default iPhone Encryption Isn’t Enough, VIRTRU, https://www.virtru.com/blog/
iphone-encryption/ [https://perma.cc/5J6G-QNAY].
239. Adam Thompson, Browser Updates Round-Up: Continuing the Push for HTTPS Everywhere,
(Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.thesslstore.com/blog/browser-updates-round-upcontinuing-the-push-for-https-everywhere/ [https://perma.cc/8W2U-63WF].
HASHEDOUT

240. Id.; Lawrence E. Hecht, SSL Adoption Continues to Rise, THE NEW STACK (Apr. 14, 2018),
https://thenewstack.io/ssl-adoption-continues-to-rise/ [https://perma.cc/J6VY-TLMS].
241. Koops et al., supra note 13, at 568.
242. Id. at 572.
243. Id. at 501.
244. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 453 (1958).
245. Id. at 466.
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governmental action in the cases above were thought likely to
produce upon the particular constitutional rights there involved.
This Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom
to associate and privacy in one’s associations.
...
Compelled disclosure of membership in an organization engaged
in advocacy of particular beliefs is of the same order. Inviolability
of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be
indispensable to preservation of freedom of association,
particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.246
Further, the Court held that freedom to associate with organizations
dedicated to the “advancement of beliefs and ideas” is an inseparable part
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.247
Highlighting privacy’s tie to physical safety, two years later, in Bates
v. City of Little Rock,248 the Supreme Court held that that disclosure of the
NAACP’s local branch’s membership lists “would work a significant
interference with the freedom of association of their members” because
evidence indicated that identification of the members resulted in
harassment and threats of bodily harm.249
Just as the right to meet in private is protected by the First Amendment,
so too is the right to speak (or write) anonymously. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly noted the existence of a “profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open.”250 Political speech receives the highest constitutional
protection because it “occupies the core of the protection afforded by the
First Amendment.”251 The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the
right of dissidents and others to speak anonymously when they have a
credible fear of retaliation for what they say. Thus, the Supreme Court has
struck down several statutes requiring public disclosure of the names of
members of dissident groups.252
246. Id. at 462. The Court did not hold that membership lists were absolutely privileged from
disclosure but emphasized that the State had failed to make a sufficient case that it needed the
information. Id. at 466.
247. Id. at 460.
248. 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
249. Id. at 523–24.
250. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
251. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995); see also Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60 (1960) (holding ordinance that prohibited distribution of anonymous handbills
unconstitutional).
252. See Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91 (1982) (holding that
the “Constitution protects against the compelled disclosure of political associations”); Shelton v.
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The tie between identity protection and safety remains a theme in more
modern decisions protecting the right to anonymous political and religious
speech.253 In Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v.
Village of Stratton254 the Supreme Court struck down a village ordinance
requiring all door-to-door solicitors and canvassers—whether religious or
commercial—to register with the village and to disclose their identities
and the reason they wished to go door-to-door.255 The Watchtower Bible
and Tract Society (known also as Jehovah’s Witnesses), a religious group
that wished to go door-to-door in order to proselytize, challenged the
ordinance as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the
“breadth and unprecedented nature of this regulation” meant that it
violated the First Amendment: “Even if the interest in preventing fraud
could adequately support the ordinance insofar as it applies to commercial
transactions and the solicitation of funds, that interest provides no support
for its application to petitioners [or] to political campaigns . . . .”256
The ability to keep identifying information private when engaging in
political activity—that is, the ability to communicate anonymously or
pseudonymously—serves many ends.257 One of them is that it protects the
speaker from retaliation, as activists can face threats and also
actual violence.258
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485–487 (1960) (holding invalid a statute that compelled teachers to disclose
associational ties because it deprived them of their right of free association).
253. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64–65 (“Persecuted groups and sects . . . have been able to criticize
oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all . . . due in part to the knowledge that
exposure of the names of printers, writers[,] and distributors would lessen the circulation of literature
critical of the government.”); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village
of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342.
254. 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
255. Id. at 150.
256. Id. at 168.
257. See A. Michael Froomkin, Lessons Learned Too Well: Anonymity in a Time of Surveillance,
59 ARIZ. L. REV. 95 (2017); Froomkin, From Anonymity, supra note 237; Froomkin, Anonymity,
supra note 56.
258. See, e.g., Chantal Da Silva, Florida School Shooting Survivors Receiving Death Threats Over
Their Efforts To Tighten Gun Control, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 26, 2018), http://www.newsweek.com/flori
da-school-shooting-survivors-death-threats-819484 [https://perma.cc/38BB-4JK8] (discussing an
activist who received death threats after campaigning for gun control measures). Relatedly, strong
privacy protections are important to protect against oppressive governments. Repressive regimes
often target dissidents who are then imprisoned, tortured, and sometimes killed. In Dep’t of State v.
Ray, the Supreme Court held that the identities of certain Haitian emigrants must be kept private in
part because of the risk that the Haitian government would retaliate and perhaps even inflict physical
harm. 502 U.S. 164, 176–77 (1991) (“[D]isclosure of the unredacted interview summaries would
publicly identify the interviewees as people who cooperated with a State Department investigation of
the Haitian Government’s compliance with its promise to the United States Government not to
prosecute the returnees . . . . How significant the danger of mistreatment may now be is, of course,
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Protection of Proprietary Privacy—Physical and Virtual

Proprietary privacy concerns the use of property to keep objects or
information from others259: A purse conceals objects from others, as does
keeping objects in the glove compartment of a car.260 Fourth Amendment
law ordinarily controls when the government can pierce the concealment
a person has put around an object or a conversation, and that law relies
greatly on the nebulous and contextual concept of “reasonable
expectations.” For example, U.S. law recognizes that when bringing a
suitcase through the airport, its owner has an expectation of privacy
relating to what is inside the luggage as against other travelers, but not as
against airport security or customs agents legally authorized to inspect the
luggage for dangerous materials or contraband.261 A surprising amount of
private law relating to privacy tracks, or is influenced by, the expectations
considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. For example, to
make out a claim for the tort of unreasonable intrusion a plaintiff must
demonstrate he or she had “an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in the place, conversation, or activity upon which the defendant
allegedly intruded.”262
Traditionally, proprietary privacy related to things, tangible chattels.
However, proprietary privacy increasingly relates to intangibles, data,
virtual things. Privacy is obviously an essential component to the safety
of any account secured by a password. Accounts, such as online bank
accounts, may also be secured by requiring a user ID or even two-factor
authentication.263 Failing to keep access credentials private exposes the
account’s owner to financial or other fraud.
Even those who use reasonable safeguards for their access credentials
remain at risk of identity theft (ID theft), a form of fraud in which the
attacker acquires the target’s credentials and then impersonates the target

impossible to measure, but the privacy interest in protecting these individuals from any retaliatory
action that might result from a renewed interest in their aborted attempts to emigrate must be given
great weight.”).
259. Koops et al., supra note 13, at 567.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 518.
262. Privacy, Technology, and the California “Anti-Paparazzi” Statute, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1367,
1370 (1999) (citing Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998)).
263. In two-factor authentication, the user must supply a second proof of authorization in addition
to the user/password combination. Common examples include a hardware token such as a key fob, a
code from an app on a cell phone, or keying in a code sent by email or text to a registered address or
phone number. See What is 2FA?, SECURENVOY, https://www.securenvoy.com/two-factorauthentication/what-is-2fa.shtm [https://perma.cc/5SNQ-9TS9].
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to gain financial advantage. ID theft is commonly used to get access to
bank accounts, income-tax refunds (real or fraudulently claimed), credit
cards, and health care.264 The U.S. government gives thirteen pieces of
advice to consumers about how to protect against ID theft. Of these, nine
involve securing information or being more private, and four involve
increased monitoring of credit reports and other information.265
ID theft can have devastating effects on its victims. The consequences
can be financial,266 leading to destroyed credit ratings and harassment by
debt collectors.267 A common type of ID theft involves fraudulently filing
a false tax return on behalf of another, claiming that a refund is due, and
having it sent to the thief’s address. In 2014, the IRS may have paid out
as much $3.1 billion in refund checks to victims of identity thieves.268 But
that number pales before the Justice Department’s estimate that in the
same year 17.6 million Americans older than sixteen had their personal
information stolen, leading to total damages of $15.4 billion.269
In particularly severe cases, the ID theft can be life-threatening, in one
case even leading to the victim being implicated in—and publicly linked
to—an international assassination. Nicole McCabe was an Australian
woman living in Israel when she heard a radio broadcast implicating her
in the alleged Mossad-led assassination of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in a
Dubai hotel room. McCabe had never been to Dubai— and she had her
passport. But while her passport had not been physically stolen, the
264. Identity Theft, USA.GOV (last updated Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.usa.gov/identity-theft
[https://perma.cc/6BGS-3DBN].
265. Id. The advice to check one’s credit reports has been criticized on the grounds that “making
individuals responsible for protecting their identity and reputation by such means is akin to requiring
them to leave their homes unlocked while suggesting they check with the local pawn shop to see if
any of their things are fenced as stolen.” Shostack & Syverson, supra note 55, at 137.
266. Id.
267. For example, in the fall of 2012, Alice Lipski stole Helen Anderson’s financial mail, including
old credit-card statements. Doug Shadel, ‘She Stole My Life’ – How Millions Fall Victim to Identity
Theft, AARP THE MAGAZINE (Oct./Nov. 2014), https://www.aarp.org/money/scams-fraud/info2014/identity-theft-protection.html [https://perma.cc/UWM3-PKDJ]. Lipski then registered as
Anderson for a credit-monitoring service intended to prevent ID theft—which exposed Anderson’s
complete credit history, revealing numerous canceled and inactive credit cards. Id. Lipski then
reported the cards as lost or stolen, got new cards and new online account information safeguarded
by new usernames, passwords, and security questions. Id. Since Lipski set them up, Anderson was
locked out of the accounts in her name. Id. Lipski then charged over $30,000 in Anderson’s name,
and was only caught because she forgot her purse in a department store. Id. Inside were ten driver’s
licenses—each with a different name, but all with Lipski’s picture. Id.
268. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-508, IDENTITY THEFT AND TAX FRAUD: IRS
NEEDS TO UPDATE ITS RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE TAXPAYER PROTECTION PROGRAM 14 (2016).
269. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT, 2014,
at 7 (2015).
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assassins had apparently forged a copy of it which contained all of her
personal information and substituted the agent’s picture for hers.270
McCabe reportedly stated that she was “‘terrified,’” had not slept, and was
“worried for [her] health and . . . [her unborn] baby’s health.”271
ID theft violates criminal laws in most states, and also federal law. The
Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act makes it a federal crime to
knowingly transfer or use, without lawful authority, “a means of
identification of another person” intending to commit or assist “any
unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that
constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law.”272
H.

Privacy in Evidentiary Privileges

U.S. law recognizes a host of evidentiary privileges. Although all
evidentiary privileges support communications privacy, different
privileges also support intimate, associational and, sometimes,
public privacy.
Privileges prevent the acquisition or admission of potentially relevant
testimony in service of other social policies. Thus, the right against selfincrimination protects, among other things, the intellectual privacy of the
suspect.273 The right also protects the physical safety of the suspect by
making it illegal for officials to force confessions.
The spousal privilege supports privacy in the Typology’s intimate zone.
There are actually two spousal privileges. The first is a testimonial
privilege that protects an individual from being forced to testify in
criminal proceedings in which their spouse is a defendant.274 In some
states, but not in the federal system, this testimonial privilege even allows

270. David Murray, ‘Assassin’ Nicole McCabe Alone and Scared in a World of Lies, Spies and
Killers, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (Feb. 26, 2010), https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/assassin-nicolemccabe-alone-and-scared-in-a-world-of-lies-spies-and-killers/story-e6freuy9-1225834931178
[https://perma.cc/3SDB-AR2G].
271. Id.
272. Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007 (Oct.
30, 1998) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2012)). In addition, the Theft Penalty Enhancement Act of
2004, Pub. L. 108-275, 118 Stat. 831 (July 15, 2004) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2012)),
increased penalties for “aggravated” identity theft, requiring courts to impose additional sentences of
two years for general offenses and five years for terrorism related offenses. Id. And, the Identity Theft
Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008 amends 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b) (2012) to clarify that restitution
orders for identity theft cases may include an amount equal to the value of the victim’s time spent
remediating the actual or intended harm of the identity theft or aggravated identity theft.
273. See generally NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY (2015).
274. 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 5:39 (4th
ed. 2013).
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one spouse to prevent the other from testifying.275 The second privilege
protects the contents of confidential communications between spouses
during their marriage from testimonial disclosure; this privilege is
narrower as it only applies to confidential communications, but when it
exists it applies in both civil and criminal matters.276
The long-recognized clergy-penitent privilege, under which priests and
other religious figures do not have to disclose confessional
communications from parishioners, supports both intellectual and
associational privacy. The privilege exists to protect religious freedom
and to foster and encourage spiritual relationships,277 but in the U.S. its
reach has been reduced by laws in many states that require disclosure of
child abuse.278
Lawyer-client communications are generally privileged against
disclosure in order to avoid discouraging people from seeking legal
advice, but again the privilege is not absolute. Lawyers can disclose client
information without the client’s permission in a small number of special
circumstances such as if lawyer seeks to prevent a serious future harm to
a third party.279 Even so, this privilege supports communications privacy,
behavioral privacy, and even decisional privacy.
1.

Protection Against Invidious Discrimination

The privacy that enables freedom from illegal discrimination also cuts
across several of the zones set out in the Typology. It affects the public
zone, since the search for employment, housing, or even credit is not
exactly intimate. That said, once one is in possession of a house, that place
and the human relations that take place in it might best be characterized
as intimate; similarly, once one has the job, then the office and its
relationships also might best be characterized semi-private. Arguably,
since some forms of discrimination are race-based (although religion, age,
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See Christine P. Bartholomew, Exorcising the Clergy Privilege, 103 VA. L. REV. 1015 (2017)
(setting out the history of the privilege and then critiquing as largely unnecessary).
278. See F. Robert Radel, II & Andrew A. Labbe, The Clergy-Penitent Privilege: An
Overview, G ROELLE & SALMON , http://www.gspalaw.com/the-clergy-penitent-privilege-anoverview/ [https://perma.cc/DED3-6RU7].
279. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (listing circumstances
when attorney may disclose client information); see generally Chris Clark, Against Confidentiality?
Privacy, Safety and the Public Good in Professional Communications, 6 J. SOC. WORK 117, 131
(2006) (arguing that under a liberal rights theory approach, some measures of privacy protect
autonomy of an individual but that professional obligations of confidentiality should sometimes give
way to needs of wider public).
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and national origin are also possibilities), one might consider the
withholding of facts that may provoke discrimination to belong in the
“bodily privacy” section of the Intimate Zone where Koops et al. place
genetic privacy.280
Most U.S. anti-discrimination laws penalize the use of certain known
but “protected” information to make (primarily economic) decisions.
Thus, for example, in the classic housing-discrimination story, the
landlord knows or suspects the race of the applicant, which is what
motivates the landlord’s refusal to rent an apartment to the individual.
Prohibited discrimination is not primarily a privacy story—what
motivates the discrimination is the absence of privacy: the economic actor
knows a fact about the applicant or worker that society has decided is
invidious if treated as a factor in decision-making. Of course, in many
cases, especially in an ongoing employment relationship, masking the
information that someone is a member of a protected class is not a
practical option. But in the set of cases where the parties have yet to
establish a face-to-face relationship, not divulging the personal
characteristic at issue would be a solution to the discrimination problem
since if the decider didn’t know, for example, the race of the applicant,
and also could not infer it reliably,281 then perforce the decision would be
race-neutral.
U.S. federal statutes make it an offense for employers to discriminate
on grounds of age,282 disability,283 genetic information,284 race or color,285

280. See Koops et al, supra note 13, at 569.
281. When evaluating paper applications U.S. employers discriminate against applicants with
African-American sounding names. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and
Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market
Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 991 (2004) (finding “[w]hite names receive 50 percent more
callbacks for interviews”).
282. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602,
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-24 (2012)), forbids age discrimination in employment
against qualified persons who are age forty or older.
283. The Americans with Disabilities Act (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12100 et seq (2012)
and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012), prohibit discrimination against qualified but
disabled applicants in employment.
284. Title II of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), Pub. L. 110–233,
122 Stat. 881 (codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 2000ff, et seq. (2012)), prohibits genetic information
discrimination in employment.
285. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (Title VII) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2012)).
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religion,286 national origin,287 sex,288 or pregnancy.289 Similar laws ban
discrimination on grounds of race or color, national origin, religion, or
gender in other important economic relationships such as housing,290 or
access to credit.291 The formal structure of these rules requires the actors
to ignore some feature of the applicant even though it may literally be
staring the employer, landlord, or lender in the face: As many have noted,
the dominant trope in US anti-discrimination law is a legally mandated
‘blindness’ to certain facts.292
The problem with most of these rules, however, is that they are hard to
enforce since bias can be difficult to detect and even harder to prove.
When possible, it is far more efficient to mask the information that might
lead to discrimination. The effect of adding some privacy to hiring is
potentially significant. When, for example, orchestras began to use a
screen to hide the identity of players auditioning for places, the number of
women hired increased 30% according to a study that looked at hiring
patterns from 1970 to the 1990s.293 On the other hand, outside the context
of economic relations, there can be circumstances in which masking
information about a person’s race, gender, or sexual orientation can lead
to the perpetuation of stereotypes and other unwanted results.294
Many genetic characteristics other than race and gender that might lead

286. Id.
287. Id. In addition, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), makes it illegal for an employer to discriminate
with respect to hiring, firing, or recruitment or referral for a fee, based upon an individual’s citizenship
or immigration status.
288. Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
289. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)) forbids discrimination based on pregnancy in any aspect of
employment.
290. The Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601–3619), forbids discrimination in all aspects of residential-real-estate-related transactions,
such as buying, selling, or renting a home.
291. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), Pub. L. 93-495, Title V, 88 Stat. 1500 (1974)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f), forbids credit discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or whether a person receives income from a
public assistance program.
292. Robert C. Post, The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, in PREJUDICIAL
APPEARANCES 1, 14 (Robert C. Post, ed. 2001) (citing Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment
Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 235 (1971)).
293. See Claudia Goldin & Cecelia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind”
Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 738 (2000).
294. See Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1140–45, 1167–69, 1183–84, 1201–02
(2004).
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to genetic discrimination by employers, insurers, and others are not visible
without some kind of testing. The U.S. Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)295 currently protects workers against
genetic discrimination in employment and insurance, but does not cover
many other areas, notably college athletics296 and arguably schools
more generally.297
The case that privacy enhances economic safety is easiest to make
when the characteristics that might prompt invidious discrimination are
not visible to the naked eye. Marital status, some ethnic origins, and many
religious affiliations will not be visible to the observer, which is why we
have rules forbidding lenders, employers, and landlords to ask questions
about these characteristics.
Similar arguments apply to a range of life choices (with, again, a range
of visibility) that could become occasions for discrimination. Privacy
protects the economically vulnerable from being targeted due to sexual
orientation, associations, or a decision to terminate a pregnancy.298
IV. PRIVACY GAPS
New technologies create opportunities for surveillance and control.
Enhancing privacy rights is one logical response to these threats. So, while
above we surveyed examples of U.S. law seeking to protect safety by
ensuring privacy, in this Part we offer examples of gaps in such
protections: areas where safety is threatened by a lack of
privacy regulation.
We identify and discuss three representative technologies—the Internet
of Things (IoT), social media, and connected cars—each of which reduce

295. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-223, 122 Stat. 881
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). Cf. Bradley A. Areheart &
Jessica L. Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and the Future of Employee Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 710 (arguing
that while GINA has failed to fulfill its purpose of improving attitudes toward genetic testing, it has
achieved unanticipated success as an employee privacy statute).
296. See Heather R. Quick, Privacy for Safety: The NCAA Sickle-Cell Trait Testing Policy and the
Potential for Future Discrimination, 97 IOWA L. REV. 665, 669–70, 683–86 (2012) (critiquing NCAA
legislation requiring Division I schools to require student-athletes to either undergo sickle-cell trait
testing or release the school from liability on grounds that this will expose students to danger of
subsequent genetic discrimination in employment).
297. See Tyler Wood, Genetic Information Discrimination in Public Schools: A Common-Sense
Exception, 49 U. PAC. L. REV. 309 (2018).
298. Cf. Jean V. McHale & June Jones, Privacy, Confidentiality and Abortion Statistics: a Question
of Public Interest?, 38(1) J. MED. ETHICS 31, 33 (2012) (“The need to maintain patient confidentiality,
both for women who have had terminations and for those who will have in the future, is of course
paramount to good healthcare. This is undoubtedly highly sensitive information.”).
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personal privacy and thus expose people to new dangers. IoT and
connected cars expose the user (and others within the home or the car) to
surveillance and potential manipulation, or disclosure of intimate facts.
With social media, people effectively spy on themselves, raising questions
about what sort of regulation, if any, would protect their privacy, and thus
their safety.
Each of the technologies surveyed in this Part threaten to restrict
behavioral privacy. Behavioral privacy consists of an individual’s
freedom to move about without surveillance while in public. U.S. law
tends to assume that the reasonable expectation of privacy in public is
quite limited. Nevertheless, the law does regard as reasonable certain
expectations of privacy while in public, such as not being stalked or
invasively monitored.299
Whether or not it is reasonable to expect a degree of privacy in public,
cameras are increasingly ubiquitous, creating a risk that someone is
recording any and perhaps all behavior outside the home. The rise of
social media means that photos—and tagging—can happen anywhere.300
Rapid improvement of facial recognition software creates the danger that
images can cheaply and reliably be linked to identities. Also, as discussed
below301 connected cars provide another avenue for tracking personal
movement outside the home. Together these and other technologies risk
substantially chilling the freedom of association, and behavioral privacy
more generally.302 Meanwhile, a person’s online activities, especially but
not only on social media, have a legal status little different from physically
public activity, thus extending both public and private surveillance into
the home. If and when social scoring303 becomes more common, the
effects on behavioral privacy will only become more significant.
A.

Threats from the Internet of Things (IOT)

The Internet of Things (IoT) is shorthand for to the ability of everyday
objects to connect to the Internet and to send and receive data.304 Up to

299. Koops et al., supra note 13, at 568; see also supra section III.A.2.d (Protection from Stalkers).
300. See infra section IV.C.
301. See infra section IV.B.
302. See Moritz Büchi et al., Chilling Effects of Profiling Activities: Mapping the Issues (Apr. 28,
2019) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3379275 [https://perma.cc/7HNJ-LYKQ] ; Kaminsky & Witnov, supra note 198.
303. See Kaminsky & Witnov, supra note 198.
304. FTC, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD,
at i (2015).
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two billion IoT devices are in use around the world, with more to come.305
Dangers from the proliferation of IoT devices are as varied as the devices
themselves, and often invisible to the user. IoT devices can phone home
to the manufacturer, they reveal information to third parties, and also may
be vulnerable to hacking.306 “Light switches, cooking pans, stuffed
animals, basketballs, headbands, water bottles, rectal thermometers, and
more are now all connected to the Internet and our mobile devices.”307 As
IoT devices seem set to permeate the home, work, and public spaces, they
implicate all four of the Typology’s zones of privacy: personal, intimate,
semi-private, and public.
The enabling of unauthorized access to the devices creates dangers that
the intruder will instruct the device to do something harmful, although the
instruction and the harm depend on the device’s capabilities. Even though
it is early days, it is reasonable to expect that, in the future, IoT devices
also will create unpredictable new dangers because they are potentially
long-lived, and thus will outlive their security model.308
Domestic IoT devices range from juicers to condoms309 to voiceactivated digital assistants to home automation systems.310 IoT devices
also proliferate well beyond the confines of the home, as we connect
everything to the Internet and cloud storage. For example, smart cities rely
on IoT-connected devices to enhance “environmental monitoring and
analysis of data to prevent waste. For example, smart trashcans . . . use
real-time data collection and alerts to trigger bin collection.”311
One especially stark set of IoT-related physical dangers arises from

305. Sukhvir Notra et al., An Experimental Study of Security and Privacy Risks with Emerging
Household Appliances, in 2014 IEEE CONFERENCE ON COMMUNICATIONS AND NETWORK SECURITY
79 (2014). However, “breathless predictions of market [size] should be taken with a grain of salt.”
Gilad Rosner & Erin Kenneally, Privacy and the Internet of Things: Emerging Frameworks for Policy
and Design, in CENTER FOR LONG-TERM CYBERSECURITY WHITE PAPER SERIES 5 (June 7, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3320670 (last visited Mar. 9, 2020).
306. “[M]any IoT devices have long-standing, widely-known software vulnerabilities that make
them prone to exploit and control by remote attackers.” Nick Feamster, Mitigating the Increasing
Risks of an Insecure Internet of Things, 16 COLO. TECH. L.J. 87, 88 (2017).
307. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, The Internet of Heirlooms and Disposable Things, 17
N.C. J. L. & TECH. 581, 582. “Japanese security researchers have already hacked an IoToilet, giving
them the ability to flush and squirt water at people.” Id. at 582–83.
308. Id. at 581 (noting that objects, like coffee pots and dolls, can last long after the standard lifecycle of software).
309. See Stefan Ducich, These Walls Can Talk! Securing Digital Privacy in the Smart Home Under
the Fourth Amendment, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 278, 280–81 (2018).
310. Hillary Brill & Scott Jones, Little Things and Big Challenges: Information Privacy and the
Internet of Things, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1192 (2017).
311. Id. at 1195 (giving example of “Big Belly Trash”).
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medical devices, such as insulin pumps,312 pacemakers, and implantable
cardiac defibrillators.313 Although as far as we are aware, as of this
writing, there are no publicly reported incidents of an implanted medical
device being hacked to harm the patient, the prospect prompted the recall
of 500,000 pacemakers in 2017 alone.314
Similarly, IoT devices in the body or in the home could be hacked to
permit the acquisition and misuse of the owner’s personal information,
creating risks to personal safety, which again will vary with what the
device knows and can sense about the user. Information acquisition alone
still poses personal dangers as some devices will know the user’s location
while others will have credit-card or other financial data. Still others will
allow an attacker to infer location. For example, devices with motion
sensors and voice-activated smart-home devices will behave differently
when persons are in the house, revealing location by inference.
Even in the absence of malfunction or hacking, the makers of IoT
devices may design them to permit the collection and then use of personal
information, habits, locations, and physical conditions. In turn, this
information might be used to make credit, insurance, and employment
decisions,315 or, if acquired by the public sector, to make decisions about
individuals’ dangerousness, or to follow up on suspicion of criminal
actions.316 In 2017, VIZIO paid the Federal Trade Commission and the
New Jersey Attorney General’s Office $2.2 million for installing software
that could collect users’ viewing data in eleven million consumers’
televisions without their consent or knowledge. VIZIO TVs appended
specific demographic information to the viewing data, such as sex, age,
income, marital status, household size, education level, home ownership,
and home value; the company then sold the viewing and demographic
information to third parties.317
312. See J&J Warns Diabetic Patients: Insulin Pump Vulnerable to Hacking, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2016),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-johnson-johnson-cyber-insulin-pumps-e/exclusive-jj-warns-patients-ofinsulin-pump-cyber-bug-low-hacking-risk-idUSKCN12411L [https://perma.cc/KR47-D9NR].
313. See Scott J. Shackelford et al., When Toasters Attack: A Polycentric Approach to Enhancing
the “Security of Things,” 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 415, 436 (2017); Lily H. Newman, Medical
Devices Are the Next Security Nightmare, WIRED (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/
medical-devices-next-security-nightmare/ [https://perma.cc/6P29-7XPJ].
314. See Nicholas Shields, The FDA Has Recalled About 500,000 Internet-Connected
Pacemakers Over Hacking Fears, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 1, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/fd
a-recalls-500000-internet-pacemakers-hacking-fears-2017-9 [https://perma.cc/QL48-FFL5].
315. See FTC, supra note 304, at ii.
316. See Andrew G. Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109 (2017)
(discussing the emerging use of predictive policing).
317. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, VIZIO to Pay $2.2 Million to FTC, State of New
Jersey to Settle Charges It Collected Viewing Histories on 11 Million Smart Televisions Without
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Perhaps the most notorious recent IoT incident involved a Portland,
Oregon couple who discovered that their Amazon Alexa device had
somehow recorded a domestic conversation and then silently emailed the
recording to an acquaintance.318 Amazon described the incident as the
result of multiple misheard commands, suggesting it was a rare and
unusual event,319 but it serves well as a proof of concept for how an IoT
device can be listening in the home and quietly sending audio to anyone.
We probably have only just begun to imagine the ways in which hacked
IoT devices can harm users. Already, domestic-abuse victims have
reported that former partners used remotely controlled devices to change
electronic locks, ring the doorbell, change the behavior of thermostats or
lights, set smart speakers to blare music, or spy on them via security
cameras. 320 In extreme cases, victims have been referred for involuntary
psychiatric evaluation when they complained that their ex-partners were
remotely controlling devices in their homes, or spying on them at all
hours. “[Y]ou can start to look crazy,” said the director of a Silicon Valley
domestic-violence program.321
B.

Threats from Connected Cars

Connected cars have some ability to record, send, or receive
information.322 How much varies with the vehicle and with time—newer
cars tend to collect more information about the car’s usage and location,
the driver’s behavior, and even non-automotive information such as a
passenger’s synced cell-phone contacts or messages.323
A connected car does not have to have any autonomous capabilities;
conversely, autonomous vehicles almost certainly will require the ability
Users’ Consent (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/02/vizio-pay22-million-ftc-state-new-jersey-settle-charges-it [https://perma.cc/PV9X-FSKJ].
318. Ry Crist, Alexa Sent Private Audio to a Random Contact, Portland Family Says, CNET
(May 24, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/news/alexa-sent-private-audio-to-a-random-contact-portl
and-family-says/ [https://perma.cc/UV85-7MM6].
319. Id.
320. See Nellie Bowles, Thermostats, Locks and Lights: Digital Tools of Domestic Abuse, N.Y.
TIMES (June 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/technology/smart-home-devicesdomestic-abuse.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2020); Catalin Cimpanu, Someone Is Taking Over Insecure
Cameras and Spying on Device Owners, BLEEPINGCOMPUTER (June 23, 2018), https://www.bleepin
gcomputer.com/news/security/someone-is-taking-over-insecure-cameras-and-spying-on-deviceowners/ [https://perma.cc/S9R6-Y5SP].
321. Bowles, supra note 320 (quoting Ruth Patrick, head of WomenSV).
322. LindseyBarrett, Herbie Fully Downloaded: Data-Driven Vehicles and the Automobile
Exception, 106 GEO. L.J. 181, 184 (2017).
323. Id. at 185.
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“to collect, send, and receive different types of data, or will at least depend
on some manner of mapped data (such as through GPS) for the vehicle to
function autonomously, in addition to any connected features the car may
have.”324
Thus, the car of the future, and some of the cars of today also, will be
able to store and report not just the vehicle’s location and speed, but also
the passenger’s media habits, cell-phone calls, and even in-car
conversations. Already today, connected-car systems come standard in
many models; not only are they active whether or not the user chooses to
use them but even a determined hobbyist willing to void the warranty may
find them hard to disable.325 Connected cars can also be very invasive.
While yesterday’s drivers could reasonably think of their in-car time as a
private moment, today’s BMWs come with Alexa built-in,326 and perhaps
listening in as well.327 Other cars may soon have sensors capable of voice
or facial recognition of all passengers, allowing tailoring of the driving
experience to their preferences and health monitoring of drivers, but also
collection of yet more information about the car’s use.328 Manufacturers
may include an off switch—the VW Golf has a little-known switch only
accessible to dealers that can turn off data sharing329—but no U.S. law
requires that the car makers do so.330
324. Id. at 187–88.
325. Shuko, How to kill CarNet (also, what’s inside the box and buttons.), GOLFMK7 (April 20,
2015), https://www.golfmk7.com/forums/showthread.php?t=9618 [https://perma.cc/3CVR-HE7G]
(“Just removing the antenna did not disable the communications. It [a VW Golf] was able to connect
as if nothing was wrong, even after I tried shorting the leads together.”).
326. Frederic Lardinois, BMW’s Alexa Integration Gets it Right, TECH CRUNCH (July 29, 2018),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/29/bmws-alexa-integration-gets-it-right/ [https://perma.cc/733V-DRVE].
327. Erin Biba, How Connected Car Tech is Eroding Personal Privacy, BBC (Aug 9, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/autos/story/20160809-your-car-is-not-your-friend [https://perma.cc/F4FG-8WGZ].
328. Future of Privacy Forum, The Connected Car and Privacy: Navigating New Data Issues 8
(Nov. 13, 2014), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/FPF_Data-Collection-and-the-ConnectedCar_November2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/WLQ5-SUYE].
329. Biba, supra note 327.
330. In 2014, U.S. automakers voluntarily subscribed to a set of “Consumer Privacy Protection
Principles” promising transparency as to their monitoring activities. However, under these principles
when a participating automaker provides adequate notice to the consumer, the “Owner’s or Registered
User’s acceptance and use of Vehicle Technologies and Services constitutes consent to the associated
information practices.” In other words, the consumer need give no further affirmative consent. The
sole exceptions requiring actual affirmative consent are the use of geolocation information,
biometrics, or driver information for marketing, or the sharing of any of these three types of
information with third parties. ALLIANCE OF AUTO. MFRS., INC. & ASS’N OF GLOBAL AUTOMAKERS,
INC., CONSUMER PRIVACY PROTECTION PRINCIPLES: PRIVACY PRINCIPLES FOR VEHICLE TECHNO
LOGIES AND SERVICES 8 (2014), https://autoalliance.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/01/Consumer_
Privacy_Principlesfor_VehicleTechnologies_Services.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4PB-2Z57].
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The connected car will mate the dangers of location tracking with the
dangers of the IoT, making a person’s location more visible to attackers,
and also putting the car at some risk of being hacked in ways that might
endanger the passengers. In so doing, connected cars implicate the
Typology’s intimate zone (special privacy), the semi-private zone (not
only communications privacy but also associational privacy, in that the
car will allow third parties to use location mapping to reveal associations),
and the public zone (in that its tracking powers effect behavioral privacy).
C.

Threats from Oversharing

Lack of privacy—usually self-inflicted via social-media posts—has
created new dangers for social media users. Instagram posts can reveal
details about the home and about children. Twitter routinely geo-tags
posts made from cell phones, revealing the poster’s location.
Consider the threat that social media posts can pose to travelers.
“‘Instead of looking for physical signs that a home is unoccupied, burglars
can simply scan Instagram posts, monitor Twitter feeds and check
Facebook for signs that someone isn’t home.’”331 Posted photos showing
off prized items within one’s home can become personalized treasure
maps for burglars.
Posting the wrong picture may also obviate the need for would-be
intruders to break in. A photo clearly depicting a house or car key can
provide sufficient detail for an intruder to make a usable copy of the
key,332 leading one commentator to call on journalists to “Stop Posting
Photos of Real Keys in News Stories.”333 A similar problem arises when
news or other photos taken in offices or homes reveal passwords on
strategically placed post-its. Notoriously, a photo of the Hawaii
Emergency Management Agency—taken shortly after the false missile
alert that briefly terrified residents of that State—revealed a password for
accessing the alert system.334
Although oversharing implicates privacy interests in arguably all four
331. The Hidden Dangers of Oversharing on Social Media, GREATER NASHVILLE HOUSE & HOME
& GARDEN, (Jan. 31, 2018), https://houseandhomenashville.com/5571/the-hidden-dangers-ofoversharing-on-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/D7L2-CJAC] (quoting Mercury Insurance VP of
Claims Kevin Quinn).
332. Schuyler Towne, A Key You Can Photograph Is a Key That Can Be Copied, GIZMODO
(Feb. 13. 2014), https://gizmodo.com/any-key-you-can-photograph-is-a-key-that-can-be-copied1522264272 [https://perma.cc/FUP2-JP47].
333. See Brady Dale, Stop Posting Photos of Real Keys in News Stories, OBSERVER.COM (May 5,
2016), http://observer.com/2016/05/copying-keys-from-photos/ [https://perma.cc/94LV-L6YR].
334. See Kif Leswing, A Password for the Hawaii Emergency Agency was Hiding in a Public Photo, Written
on a Post-It Note, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 16, 2018), http://www.businessinsider.com/hawaii-emergency-agencypassword-discovered-in-photo-sparks-security-criticism-2018-1 [https://perma.cc/D8UV-D5LN].
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zones, it differs from our two other examples in key respects. First,
oversharing is something that people do to themselves. Second, the
communication, if not necessarily all the meta-data that gets associated
with it, is voluntary and is constitutionally protected speech on the part of
the social media user. As a result, even if some uses of social media may
put the user in danger, the scope for regulation is very limited, and may
not extend beyond user education campaigns and transparency rules
requiring social media platforms to disclose what sort of invisible
information they may collect or disclose.
CONCLUSION
As we stated at the outset, privacy is not a one-way street. We do not
dispute that in many cases transparency—the absence of privacy—can
enhance safety. Instead, we have sought to demonstrate that privacy too
can enhance various types of safety, and that indeed current law and social
institutions frequently recognize and cater to this reality.
As our survey in Part III shows, how and when privacy is safety varies
with the circumstances. Some privacy protections, especially those that
protect against physical dangers, are direct, but many are mixed in with
larger social goals. We protect informants and whistleblowers for reasons
much the same as we protect penitents and political organizers: in each
case, we think that by making people safe we not only protect the
individual but serve a broader social policy.
In both law and philosophy, claims to privacy require justification.
Some classic justifications are based on first principles, claiming that
privacy is itself a fundamental human right. For example, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and many other international and regional treaties
recognize privacy as fundamental.335
But justifications can also rely on instrumental claims that privacy
furthers worthy goals, which themselves trace their provenance to
something fundamental. Instrumental claims for privacy come in many
forms, ranging from Richard Posner’s claim that privacy is no more than
an intermediate good (and thus, actually, quite often a bad) to empirical
claims that privacy is an essential component of human flourishing and
self-determination because it creates a zone of mental or physical
independence necessary to allow experimentation and self-realization. In
between these extremes lie practical accommodations—many of which
335. See David Banisar & Simon Davies, Global Trends in Privacy Protection: An International
Survey of Privacy, Data Protection, and Surveillance Laws and Developments, 18 MARSHALL. J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 3 (1999).
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we may take for granted. Not surprisingly, though, instrumental
justifications always relate to a person’s interactions with social practices.
In general, these instrumental arguments are subject to two types of
counterarguments. First, they can be rebutted by countervailing
instrumental arguments: each claimed good effect can be offset by a
claimed equal or larger harmful effect. Second, if rights are trumps,336 then
instrumental claims may be vulnerable to pure rights-based claims,
although the extent to which that is convincing may depend on how
central the specific instrumental claim is to the realization of the
underlying right or rights that it serves, enhances, or enables.
Despite our recognition of these potential rebuttals, we have focused
here on instrumental cases for understanding privacy as safety because
those are the ones most likely to persuade U.S. administrative agencies to
regulate with any eye toward protecting privacy as part of their variegated
missions to protect people against various risks.337 If the United States had
a general privacy policy akin to the GDPR, then such arguments would be
unnecessary because U.S. agencies would have a broad freestanding
obligation to consider privacy for its own sake rather than privacy as
something else. Yet even without such a general mandate, U.S. law
contains many provisions designed to enhance and protect public safety.
If privacy is safety, even only in part, then U.S. law may turn out to be
more protective of privacy than any of us suspected.338
Nevertheless, there are still areas where regulation could increase
safety by increasing privacy. If privacy has instrumental value because it
protects safety, for instance, if it is safety, then when new technologies
undermine privacy in ways that threaten safety directly or indirectly,
agencies with safety mandates will have the duty, or the discretion, to
intervene. And even where regulation might be inappropriate or difficult,
as with the case of oversharing, we would benefit from a better
understanding of the ways in which the absence of privacy causes an
absence of safety.
By showing that privacy, in several of its varied forms, enhances safety,
we have tried to underline how privacy has far broader safety effects than
is commonly recognized. We hope this will spur greater respect for the
instrumental value of privacy, more privacy protections in the United
States, and in turn more safety.
336. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at xi (1977).
337. As noted above, a future work, tentatively titled “Safety as Privacy,” will seek to show that
privacy falls within the safety mission of several U.S. administrative agencies.
338. Cf. MOLIERE, LE BOURGEOIS GENTILHOMME, Act II; scene 6 (“Par ma foi! il y a plus de
quarante ans que je dis de la prose sans que j’en susse rien.”) (emphasis in original) (translated into
English as: “By my faith! For more than forty years I have been speaking prose without knowing it”).

